Next semester, I will be participating in a new pilot project at my institution. I teach freshman writing; next semester I have the second part of the sequence, in which students learn research and writing. I've elected - partly out of a desire for a new experience and partly out of a belief that the project will actually help my students learn better - to participate in a project that will introduce our students to the process of accumulating a writing portfolio.
This is something I did as an undergraduate student myself, though I was older than my freshmen (I did this in an advanced English course on Victorian Poetry). However, recalling the process, I am a firm believer that this will be invaluable to them, not only in terms of their writing, but in terms of teaching them organizational and time-management skills - two things sorely lacking in many of today's incoming freshmen. I also did something similar in high school (despite having a horrible overall high school experience, the education I received was exceptional), and it is actually this model on which I would ideally like to base my own course (though there will be planning meetings that might change this idea).
We were assigned a poet (we did have some choice) and asked to do historical, biographical, and literary research into that poet's life, situation, and works. Then we had to do an analysis of their overall trend as a poet and a deep analysis of a single poem. We were assigned to do notecards, outlines, bibliographies, etc. While many things I did I have no intention of ever doing again as a part of the research process, I did learn a great deal about how I work and how to best organize my thoughts.
I want my students to learn about their own learning process as much as I did. Whether they learn about Shakespeare in the process, I think, is largely incidental. If, for instance, they are more interested in the history of witchcraft or in the development from theater to film, I'm more than happy to let them go down that road.
However, my primary concern here is that the whole educational system, from grade school through higher education, is headed in a disturbingly individual-oriented direction. This is not to say that the individual student should be ignored. However, what I do not want to see happen is the privileging of the self over the material. I want students to learn about their interests, not project themselves onto a subject.
What I want to see is a student finding a passion and discovering how he or she best documents and retains that information, what they can do with it, and what it teaches them about their world. What I do not want to see is a student assigning a largely arbitrary judgment to something based on their own narrow world-view. I want to draw their attention away from the one thing that has - for the most part - made up their entire understanding of the universe: themselves. I want them to see that there is more to the world than what they see of it.
I do not want to convert them to my politics or religious views. I do not want them to (necessarily) join a cause or save the world. I want them to see that the student next to them is as important as they are. To see that the world needs more voices than one.
I believe - firmly - that if we can see that there are more people in this world than ourselves, that we will begin to learn to respect one another. I do not think that this will solve world hunger or bring about world peace - as a species we are too greedy and too violent for that. But I do think that, in general, there is much about our lives and our relations with one another, yes, even on an international scale, that might be helped by basic respect for people as people. For the acknowledgment that the person next to us is no less of a person because of their race or gender or creed. Even - I must remind myself - if they are a complete idiot.
My own tolerance for stupidity (in which I hypocritically include intolerance) is low. I despise ignorance, particularly since there are so many opportunities to eliminate it. I hate willful ignorance, in which someone blatantly refuses to believe what stands before them, real and solid. And, ironically, it is this which I seek to obliterate, which I refuse to tolerate.
Hypocritical? Yes. But I like to think that one can eliminate (in theory) stupidity without eliminating people. After all, the most rational of fictional races wished one another well by saying "Live long, and prosper." Life and prosperity are the products not of blind faith and intolerance, but of enlightenment and acceptance.
Live long, and prosper.
"Words fly up, my thoughts remain below."
black and white, Angels and demons.
We aren't two sides of the same coin.
We're the gold into which those sides are imprinted."
Monday, December 01, 2008
Friday, November 07, 2008
When Life Gets Messy
The current obsession with keeping everything tidy, not accepting long grass and leaning tombs, and treating a funeral as a refuse disposal problem, reflects a deep malaise in society... Death was never a tidy thing: it is foolish to try and make it so, and to compartment it away from life and the living. -- James Stephen Curl, 1972 (from Death, Dissection and the Destitute by Ruth Richardson, p. 7)
Though I, like approximately 53% of the country, am excited and pleased by the new president-elect, the pleasure of the promising and heartening prospect of change (as shown by these pictures) does not eliminate the unease and "malaise" created by our state of war, economic crisis, and low-grade paranoia about "terror attacks."
We like our lives to be neat, clean, and orderly (at least in the major particulars - socks on the floor don't count). We like to know whom to follow, whom to ignore, and whom to ostracize. We like to know who "We" are, and who is "Other." We like our lines to be clear and drawn in stone, not mutable sand.
This election has shown us how truly messy all of the nice, neat labels we've attempted to place on our lives and the people in them really are. Take Obama. He has been labeled (whether truthfully or erroneously) as "Black," "half-white," "Christian," "Muslim," "Arab," "Terrorist," "Patriot," "Insurrectionist," "evil," and "hope," just to name a few. Half of his labels contradict the other half (though I would like to point out that the duality of being both "Black" and "half-white" reflects the latent racism inherent in our labeling system - after all, a "half-black, half-white" man can still be called just plain "Black," but is qualified as "half-white"). Yet all have been accepted by someone as "true."
Other labels have been flying around: "liberal," "fundamentalist," "feminist," "anti-feminist," "maverick," "VPILF," and so on. Some of them are vague, others specific. But all reflect our desire to compartmentalize, to sterilize, to order the society in which we live.
James Stephen Curl, above, is talking about our tendency to quickly and hastily dispose of our dead. To purify them with chemicals and shut them away in boxes, to burn away their impurities and put them in urns or walls or scatter them over the ground. To sweep the unpleasant reminders of our own chaotic mortality away so that we don't have to confront the fact that we are, like all living things, subject to the messiness of death and decomposition. This fear of our own goopy end, he claims, indicates a "malaise," a discontent with the fulfillment of our lives.
If we accept the messiness of death, we must also accept the messiness of our lives. We must accept the fact that, regardless of our striving against it, chaos will permeate every fabric of our existence, reducing us - eventually - to the fundamental primordial stew from which our ancestral microbes first emerged. And with that knowledge, we accept that our lives are also not under our control.
Certainly, there are elements within our lives over which we do have control - whether to do the dishes, to watch television, how to raise our children, how we interact with one another - but there are even more over which we, as individuals, have little influence. Weather, earthquakes, disease (to a degree). Ultimately, we fear that which we cannot dominate, cannot subjugate to our will.
But to embrace death is to embrace this lack of control; to live with death is to live with the knowledge that there are things beyond us. I do not mean god, or the supernatural, or Fate. I mean the magic of chance, the happenstance that began our existence, the perfect coincidence that causes every interaction - chaos. Life.
Though I, like approximately 53% of the country, am excited and pleased by the new president-elect, the pleasure of the promising and heartening prospect of change (as shown by these pictures) does not eliminate the unease and "malaise" created by our state of war, economic crisis, and low-grade paranoia about "terror attacks."
We like our lives to be neat, clean, and orderly (at least in the major particulars - socks on the floor don't count). We like to know whom to follow, whom to ignore, and whom to ostracize. We like to know who "We" are, and who is "Other." We like our lines to be clear and drawn in stone, not mutable sand.
This election has shown us how truly messy all of the nice, neat labels we've attempted to place on our lives and the people in them really are. Take Obama. He has been labeled (whether truthfully or erroneously) as "Black," "half-white," "Christian," "Muslim," "Arab," "Terrorist," "Patriot," "Insurrectionist," "evil," and "hope," just to name a few. Half of his labels contradict the other half (though I would like to point out that the duality of being both "Black" and "half-white" reflects the latent racism inherent in our labeling system - after all, a "half-black, half-white" man can still be called just plain "Black," but is qualified as "half-white"). Yet all have been accepted by someone as "true."
Other labels have been flying around: "liberal," "fundamentalist," "feminist," "anti-feminist," "maverick," "VPILF," and so on. Some of them are vague, others specific. But all reflect our desire to compartmentalize, to sterilize, to order the society in which we live.
James Stephen Curl, above, is talking about our tendency to quickly and hastily dispose of our dead. To purify them with chemicals and shut them away in boxes, to burn away their impurities and put them in urns or walls or scatter them over the ground. To sweep the unpleasant reminders of our own chaotic mortality away so that we don't have to confront the fact that we are, like all living things, subject to the messiness of death and decomposition. This fear of our own goopy end, he claims, indicates a "malaise," a discontent with the fulfillment of our lives.
If we accept the messiness of death, we must also accept the messiness of our lives. We must accept the fact that, regardless of our striving against it, chaos will permeate every fabric of our existence, reducing us - eventually - to the fundamental primordial stew from which our ancestral microbes first emerged. And with that knowledge, we accept that our lives are also not under our control.
Certainly, there are elements within our lives over which we do have control - whether to do the dishes, to watch television, how to raise our children, how we interact with one another - but there are even more over which we, as individuals, have little influence. Weather, earthquakes, disease (to a degree). Ultimately, we fear that which we cannot dominate, cannot subjugate to our will.
But to embrace death is to embrace this lack of control; to live with death is to live with the knowledge that there are things beyond us. I do not mean god, or the supernatural, or Fate. I mean the magic of chance, the happenstance that began our existence, the perfect coincidence that causes every interaction - chaos. Life.
Monday, October 13, 2008
Why Politicians are Liars, and other things one learns from one's dissertation
It's an election year. The time when, once every four years, we embark upon the farce of pretending that we as a nation are gullible enough to believe all the drivel that comes out of the mouths of the chosen candidates. And of the press, their propagandists, and "unbiased third-party commercials." Right.
It's the time when all self-respecting citizens want to bang their heads repeatedly against the wall at the oblivious stupidity of their fellow Americans.
But what, you may ask, does this have to do with my dissertation on Shakespeare. Well, as Stephen Colbert remarked on a recent edition of The Colbert Report, John McCain is Macbeth. He also likened Barack Obama to Hamlet, but that's not wholly accurate. Obama seems to know who and what he is and doesn't seem to be particularly set on murdering anyone. Maybe Prince Escalus from Romeo and Juliet, perhaps Vincentio from Measure for Measure, but he's not really a tragic hero. But Colbert aside (though the episode was brilliant and featured Shakespearean scholar Stephen Greenblatt), the lessons we learn from Shakespeare, and Macbeth in particular, are highly relevant.
But I'm not thinking of Macbeth himself. Rather, I'm thinking of the other kings in his play (and hoping fervently that we don't have to go through a Macbeth). Duncan - the well-liked and well-intentioned "saint" who managed nothing more than to instigate a variety of rebellions, an invasion, and his own murder. Nice guy, though. And, finally, the subject of my thoughts: Malcolm.
Malcolm is Duncan's heir, his eldest son, and an "innocent." He claims to never have known the touch of a woman, to not drink, and to be free from greed and ambition. But he wants the throne. Oh, and he also claims (in the same scene) to be lecherous, a drunkard, a profligate spender and gambler, ambitious, vengeful, violent, and murderous. And he claims all this within about a hundred lines - no wonder poor Macduff is confused and depressed.
And here we are, facing a decision of ruler in which case we have no idea which story to believe about whom. Now, there are some pretty obvious stupidities out there - such as the infamous "Obama is an Arab" routine (for the record, he isn't) - but there are also quite a few things that are stretches of the truth or just plain fabrications that aren't obviously false. Like Malcolm's claims. He's the man who admits that he is a liar. Do you believe him because he's obviously telling the truth (only a liar can say he is a liar), or do you not believe him because he is, as he says, a liar.
The solution in Shakespeare's play is dissatisfying - Malcolm has Macduff kill Macbeth, and takes the throne. Someone else does his dirty work, and he inherits his father's throne on the functional basis of a series of lies. We don't see Malcolm's rule in Shakespeare's play. We don't know which Malcolm appears once the crown is placed upon his head. And we find ourselves faced with Macduff's decision: which set of lies do we choose? Not which do we believe, because - if we are smart - we can see that none of it is the truth, but which do we choose as the public face of our king? Do we choose the liar who speaks of restoration and order, or do we choose the liar who has experience with rule and a sword?
We are Macduff, and I do not envy him his choice.
O nation miserable!
With an untitled tyrant bloody-scepter'd,
When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again,
Since that the truest issue of thy throne
By his own interdiction stands accus'd,
And does blaspheme his breed?
... Fare thee well!
These evils thou repeat'st upon thyself
Hath banish'd me from Scotland. - O my breast,
Thy hope ends here! (4.3.103-108, 111-114)
It's the time when all self-respecting citizens want to bang their heads repeatedly against the wall at the oblivious stupidity of their fellow Americans.
But what, you may ask, does this have to do with my dissertation on Shakespeare. Well, as Stephen Colbert remarked on a recent edition of The Colbert Report, John McCain is Macbeth. He also likened Barack Obama to Hamlet, but that's not wholly accurate. Obama seems to know who and what he is and doesn't seem to be particularly set on murdering anyone. Maybe Prince Escalus from Romeo and Juliet, perhaps Vincentio from Measure for Measure, but he's not really a tragic hero. But Colbert aside (though the episode was brilliant and featured Shakespearean scholar Stephen Greenblatt), the lessons we learn from Shakespeare, and Macbeth in particular, are highly relevant.
But I'm not thinking of Macbeth himself. Rather, I'm thinking of the other kings in his play (and hoping fervently that we don't have to go through a Macbeth). Duncan - the well-liked and well-intentioned "saint" who managed nothing more than to instigate a variety of rebellions, an invasion, and his own murder. Nice guy, though. And, finally, the subject of my thoughts: Malcolm.
Malcolm is Duncan's heir, his eldest son, and an "innocent." He claims to never have known the touch of a woman, to not drink, and to be free from greed and ambition. But he wants the throne. Oh, and he also claims (in the same scene) to be lecherous, a drunkard, a profligate spender and gambler, ambitious, vengeful, violent, and murderous. And he claims all this within about a hundred lines - no wonder poor Macduff is confused and depressed.
And here we are, facing a decision of ruler in which case we have no idea which story to believe about whom. Now, there are some pretty obvious stupidities out there - such as the infamous "Obama is an Arab" routine (for the record, he isn't) - but there are also quite a few things that are stretches of the truth or just plain fabrications that aren't obviously false. Like Malcolm's claims. He's the man who admits that he is a liar. Do you believe him because he's obviously telling the truth (only a liar can say he is a liar), or do you not believe him because he is, as he says, a liar.
The solution in Shakespeare's play is dissatisfying - Malcolm has Macduff kill Macbeth, and takes the throne. Someone else does his dirty work, and he inherits his father's throne on the functional basis of a series of lies. We don't see Malcolm's rule in Shakespeare's play. We don't know which Malcolm appears once the crown is placed upon his head. And we find ourselves faced with Macduff's decision: which set of lies do we choose? Not which do we believe, because - if we are smart - we can see that none of it is the truth, but which do we choose as the public face of our king? Do we choose the liar who speaks of restoration and order, or do we choose the liar who has experience with rule and a sword?
We are Macduff, and I do not envy him his choice.
O nation miserable!
With an untitled tyrant bloody-scepter'd,
When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again,
Since that the truest issue of thy throne
By his own interdiction stands accus'd,
And does blaspheme his breed?
... Fare thee well!
These evils thou repeat'st upon thyself
Hath banish'd me from Scotland. - O my breast,
Thy hope ends here! (4.3.103-108, 111-114)
Friday, October 10, 2008
The Show of Kings
There is a good deal of critical consternation surrounding the "show of kings" in Shakespeare's Macbeth. Just how many people are on stage? What does the "glass" do? Is Banquo one of the eight, or is he a ninth body in the procession? How like to James I are the kings meant to appear?
The "show" itself is not described in the text beyond Macbeth's broken speech:
MACBETH Thou art too like the spirit of Banquo: down!
Thy crown does sear mine eye-balls: – and thy hair,
Thou other gold-bound brow, is like the first: –
A third is like the former: – filthy hags!
Why do you show me this? – A fourth? – Start, eyes!
What! will the line stretch out to th’crack of doom?
Another yet? – A seventh? – I’ll see no more: –
And yet the eight appears, who bears a glass,
Which shows me many more; and some I see,
That two-fold balls and treble sceptres carry.
Horrible sight! – Now, I see, ’tis true;
For the blood-bolter’d Banquo smiles upon me,
And points at them for his. (4.1.112-124)
There are dozens - if not hundreds - of readings of this "show" in academia. Suggestions of smoke and mirrors - literally - and even the argument that the mirror (the "glass") was used specifically to reflect James I's image back to him from where he sat in the audience. Another reading of the "glass" is of a theatrical trick; one mirror sat on stage, and another in the wings, creating the effect of an infinite line of identical kings. The most simple suggestion (and the one that seems most plausible for the outdoor theaters, at least) is that the eighth king carries a mirror that reflects back his seven companions, raising the number of kings to fifteen, which seems to be more than enough for Shakespeare's purposes. While the technician in me would love to use the mirror-trick to infinitely replicate the kings (and this was perhaps possible for an indoor court-room stage), it seems unlikely to have been done in the public playhouses.
In the passage, I read Macbeth, the witches, eight kings, and Banquo's bloody ghost. It seems clear to me that Banquo is not one of the kings, as he isn't regally dressed (he is "blood-bolter'd") and would thus stick out of the line. That's thirteen people on stage, which is also a very nice (read, "evil") number for the scene.
What I find most interesting about this scene - indeed, about the whole play - is its tendency to mingle English and Scottish politics. Macbeth, like James, is king of Scotland. Macbeth, like Elizabeth, is childless. Macbeth, like James, came to the Scottish throne following the violent death of the previous monarch (Elizabeth had Mary Queen of Scots executed). Macbeth, like Elizabeth, kills another monarch. Tricksy, William Shakespeare. Very tricksy.
So what are we to make of the "show"? Since James' descent from Banquo is fiction (concocted by Boece to placate James IV of Scotland), what DO we make of it? And what did Shakespeare make of it? Did he know Banquo was a fiction? If so, is the "show" meant to mock James' claim of descent, or is it meant to support it in theory, if not in substance? Is it Shakespeare's tip of the hat to James for being a clever dramatist in his own right, using the fiction of Banquo to support his claim to the throne as though it were truth?
I can't help but think that Shakespeare was a little impressed by James' use of the fiction, and his own adoption of it was part-tribute, part-mockery. After all, a fiction is only useful insofar as others accept the fiction as truth. Elizabeth, late in life, became almost comical as she insisted upon her "eternal youth and beauty," but it was a fiction she managed to perpetuate despite the obviousness of its falsity. But Elizabeth was aware of its failure; her insistence upon the perpetuation of the myth exploited the scission between the physical body of the monarch and the eternal aspect of sovereignty. The Queen was eternally young and beautiful, even if Elizabeth Tudor was not. James, however, did not as clearly separate the two elements of his role as king, and perhaps Shakespeare's "show" is meant to reveal his awareness of the fallibility of the fiction - and his acknowledgment that when that fiction is exposed, the structure built upon it must crumble.
The "show" itself is not described in the text beyond Macbeth's broken speech:
MACBETH Thou art too like the spirit of Banquo: down!
Thy crown does sear mine eye-balls: – and thy hair,
Thou other gold-bound brow, is like the first: –
A third is like the former: – filthy hags!
Why do you show me this? – A fourth? – Start, eyes!
What! will the line stretch out to th’crack of doom?
Another yet? – A seventh? – I’ll see no more: –
And yet the eight appears, who bears a glass,
Which shows me many more; and some I see,
That two-fold balls and treble sceptres carry.
Horrible sight! – Now, I see, ’tis true;
For the blood-bolter’d Banquo smiles upon me,
And points at them for his. (4.1.112-124)
There are dozens - if not hundreds - of readings of this "show" in academia. Suggestions of smoke and mirrors - literally - and even the argument that the mirror (the "glass") was used specifically to reflect James I's image back to him from where he sat in the audience. Another reading of the "glass" is of a theatrical trick; one mirror sat on stage, and another in the wings, creating the effect of an infinite line of identical kings. The most simple suggestion (and the one that seems most plausible for the outdoor theaters, at least) is that the eighth king carries a mirror that reflects back his seven companions, raising the number of kings to fifteen, which seems to be more than enough for Shakespeare's purposes. While the technician in me would love to use the mirror-trick to infinitely replicate the kings (and this was perhaps possible for an indoor court-room stage), it seems unlikely to have been done in the public playhouses.
In the passage, I read Macbeth, the witches, eight kings, and Banquo's bloody ghost. It seems clear to me that Banquo is not one of the kings, as he isn't regally dressed (he is "blood-bolter'd") and would thus stick out of the line. That's thirteen people on stage, which is also a very nice (read, "evil") number for the scene.
What I find most interesting about this scene - indeed, about the whole play - is its tendency to mingle English and Scottish politics. Macbeth, like James, is king of Scotland. Macbeth, like Elizabeth, is childless. Macbeth, like James, came to the Scottish throne following the violent death of the previous monarch (Elizabeth had Mary Queen of Scots executed). Macbeth, like Elizabeth, kills another monarch. Tricksy, William Shakespeare. Very tricksy.
So what are we to make of the "show"? Since James' descent from Banquo is fiction (concocted by Boece to placate James IV of Scotland), what DO we make of it? And what did Shakespeare make of it? Did he know Banquo was a fiction? If so, is the "show" meant to mock James' claim of descent, or is it meant to support it in theory, if not in substance? Is it Shakespeare's tip of the hat to James for being a clever dramatist in his own right, using the fiction of Banquo to support his claim to the throne as though it were truth?
I can't help but think that Shakespeare was a little impressed by James' use of the fiction, and his own adoption of it was part-tribute, part-mockery. After all, a fiction is only useful insofar as others accept the fiction as truth. Elizabeth, late in life, became almost comical as she insisted upon her "eternal youth and beauty," but it was a fiction she managed to perpetuate despite the obviousness of its falsity. But Elizabeth was aware of its failure; her insistence upon the perpetuation of the myth exploited the scission between the physical body of the monarch and the eternal aspect of sovereignty. The Queen was eternally young and beautiful, even if Elizabeth Tudor was not. James, however, did not as clearly separate the two elements of his role as king, and perhaps Shakespeare's "show" is meant to reveal his awareness of the fallibility of the fiction - and his acknowledgment that when that fiction is exposed, the structure built upon it must crumble.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Religion and Myth
I find it interesting that a good deal of people - scholars included - insist that "myth" is a different creature from "religion." Now, I know that my atheism probably introduces a good deal of bias here, but I still don't see a technical distinction. Even if I were religious, I would consider what is popularly considered "myth" a form of religion. Just because one thinks it is wrong should not automatically requalify it as "myth" rather than "religion."
All this comes to the forefront of my brain because I recently read Karen Armstrong's A Short History of Myth. Short, it certainly is, though her views on the development of hunting and agrarian mythologies are interesting. What irritates me about the book, however, is the clear bias toward twentieth- and twenty-first-century understandings of "religion" and "spirituality." She states that "We are meaning-seeking creatures," further stipulating that imagination is what gives rise to myth and religion:
Another peculiar characteristic of the human mind is its ability to have ideas and experiences that we cannot explain rationally. We have imagination, a faculty that enables us to think of something that is not immediately present, and that, when we first conceive it, has no objective existence. The imagination is the faculty that produces religion and myth. (Armstrong 2)
So far, I follow. We make up stories and fairy tales, so why not myths and religions? But I was initially a little disturbed at the distinction being drawn between "religion and myth." This leads her to make several claims that privilege an older, more archaic form of social imagination, stating that "Religion has been one of the most traditional ways of attaining ecstasy, but if people no longer find it in temples, synagogues, churches or mosques, they look for it elsewhere: in art, music, poetry, rock, dance, drugs, sex or sport" (Armstrong 8), as though this is a bad thing. Now, I agree that when we no longer find meaning in religion, we as a species tend to turn elsewhere. My objection is to the continual thread running through the book that implies that this is a bad thing. When she says "Today we separate the religious from the secular" (Armstrong 15), she implies sympathy with the ancients whose myth pervaded all aspects of their daily life. Why is it that my imagination may not permeate all that I do, enriching it without the false construction of mythology (or religion) to ratify it with illusory value?
As she continues, Armstrong feels obliged to apologize for identifying Jesus with Herakles - "This is not intended to be pejorative" (Armstrong 106), she writes - and states, in contradiction to her own previous distinction, that "unless a historical event is mythologised, it cannot become a source of religious inspiration" (Armstrong 106). I completely concur, yet my irritation with her for her blatant apologism leads me to almost wish she were not right. My conclusion from this is that all religion is myth, the events contained within its scope mythologized so that they may become universally accessible and permeable.
But it is when Armstrong turns to logos that I find her argument most fractured. She divides logos from myth/religion (despite the almost universal association of Logos with God or divine law) and blames it for the loss of myth in the contemporary world:
But logos had never been able to provide human beings with the sense of significance that they seemed to require. It had been myth that had given structure and meaning to life, but as modernisation progressed and logos achieved such spectacular results, mythology was increasingly discredited. (Armstrong 122)
And:
We may be more sophisticated in material ways, but we have not advanced spiritually beyond the Axial Age: because of our suppression of mythos we may even have regressed. We still long to 'get beyond' our immediate circumstances, and to enter a 'full time', a more intense, fulfilling existence. We try to enter this dimension by means of art, rock music, drugs or by entering the larger-than-life perspective of film. We still seek heroes. (Armstrong 134-135)
And, by implication, we fail to find fulfillment in these "material" things, leading, therefore, to the need for myth/religion.
She concludes with the suggestion that the "sacred" appears now in novels and works of art, that what we consider to be "academic" or "godless" (her term) really harken back to the mythology we claim to have left behind. In one sense, I agree with her. We do use alternative means to find fulfillment in our lives now that the Industrial Revolution and the Ages of Reason and Enlightenment have led us away from the Church. But why must meaning be affiliated - always - with the "sacred"? It is an argument made by Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion) and Christopher Hitchens (God is not Great), both of whom point out that they find their greatest awe when faced with the non-sacred, with science, with the scope of the human imagination. To find value, why must we always turn to something outside of human understanding and aptitude? Why can't we find fulfillment within ourselves and within our species? Are we truly so terrible that the majority of our species refuses to even consider the possibility that we - and only we - are responsible for what we have become?
All this comes to the forefront of my brain because I recently read Karen Armstrong's A Short History of Myth. Short, it certainly is, though her views on the development of hunting and agrarian mythologies are interesting. What irritates me about the book, however, is the clear bias toward twentieth- and twenty-first-century understandings of "religion" and "spirituality." She states that "We are meaning-seeking creatures," further stipulating that imagination is what gives rise to myth and religion:
Another peculiar characteristic of the human mind is its ability to have ideas and experiences that we cannot explain rationally. We have imagination, a faculty that enables us to think of something that is not immediately present, and that, when we first conceive it, has no objective existence. The imagination is the faculty that produces religion and myth. (Armstrong 2)
So far, I follow. We make up stories and fairy tales, so why not myths and religions? But I was initially a little disturbed at the distinction being drawn between "religion and myth." This leads her to make several claims that privilege an older, more archaic form of social imagination, stating that "Religion has been one of the most traditional ways of attaining ecstasy, but if people no longer find it in temples, synagogues, churches or mosques, they look for it elsewhere: in art, music, poetry, rock, dance, drugs, sex or sport" (Armstrong 8), as though this is a bad thing. Now, I agree that when we no longer find meaning in religion, we as a species tend to turn elsewhere. My objection is to the continual thread running through the book that implies that this is a bad thing. When she says "Today we separate the religious from the secular" (Armstrong 15), she implies sympathy with the ancients whose myth pervaded all aspects of their daily life. Why is it that my imagination may not permeate all that I do, enriching it without the false construction of mythology (or religion) to ratify it with illusory value?
As she continues, Armstrong feels obliged to apologize for identifying Jesus with Herakles - "This is not intended to be pejorative" (Armstrong 106), she writes - and states, in contradiction to her own previous distinction, that "unless a historical event is mythologised, it cannot become a source of religious inspiration" (Armstrong 106). I completely concur, yet my irritation with her for her blatant apologism leads me to almost wish she were not right. My conclusion from this is that all religion is myth, the events contained within its scope mythologized so that they may become universally accessible and permeable.
But it is when Armstrong turns to logos that I find her argument most fractured. She divides logos from myth/religion (despite the almost universal association of Logos with God or divine law) and blames it for the loss of myth in the contemporary world:
But logos had never been able to provide human beings with the sense of significance that they seemed to require. It had been myth that had given structure and meaning to life, but as modernisation progressed and logos achieved such spectacular results, mythology was increasingly discredited. (Armstrong 122)
And:
We may be more sophisticated in material ways, but we have not advanced spiritually beyond the Axial Age: because of our suppression of mythos we may even have regressed. We still long to 'get beyond' our immediate circumstances, and to enter a 'full time', a more intense, fulfilling existence. We try to enter this dimension by means of art, rock music, drugs or by entering the larger-than-life perspective of film. We still seek heroes. (Armstrong 134-135)
And, by implication, we fail to find fulfillment in these "material" things, leading, therefore, to the need for myth/religion.
She concludes with the suggestion that the "sacred" appears now in novels and works of art, that what we consider to be "academic" or "godless" (her term) really harken back to the mythology we claim to have left behind. In one sense, I agree with her. We do use alternative means to find fulfillment in our lives now that the Industrial Revolution and the Ages of Reason and Enlightenment have led us away from the Church. But why must meaning be affiliated - always - with the "sacred"? It is an argument made by Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion) and Christopher Hitchens (God is not Great), both of whom point out that they find their greatest awe when faced with the non-sacred, with science, with the scope of the human imagination. To find value, why must we always turn to something outside of human understanding and aptitude? Why can't we find fulfillment within ourselves and within our species? Are we truly so terrible that the majority of our species refuses to even consider the possibility that we - and only we - are responsible for what we have become?
Monday, September 08, 2008
The Epic Love Story
Having just finished rereading Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra for class next week, I am reminded yet again of the absurdity of so many of our "epic love stories," this one (and, of course, Romeo and Juliet) included. In particular, I am irritated by our response to the tragic love stories with which we we are inculcated by literature classes and movies.
These two of Shakespeare's - along with, let's say, Gone with the Wind - are perhaps the ones that aggravate me the most. It is not that they are poorly written or badly presented. Not at all. It's the placid insipidity of the characters and their utterly irrational behavior that drives me insane.
Like Jane Austen's Eleanor of Sense and Sensibility, I do not see the point of dying for love, unlike her more emotional sister Marianne, who can think of nothing more grand. I just don't see the beauty of dying for love. Dying to protect those you love, certainly. But dying for love betrays a kind of insipid and ignorant melodrama.
But I - as has often been determined - am cold and dead inside. I was never happier during my reading of Gone with the Wind than when Rhett walked out. The best part of Madame Bovary was when Emma finally died the horrible death she deserved. I desperately wanted Gwendolen of Daniel Deronda to drown when she was shoved off the boat. If Romeo had been killed by Tybalt at the beginning of the play, or if Rosaline had opened her bloody window, or if that plague Mercutio mentions had struck a little earlier... You get the idea.
I am particularly vexed by melodrama in young love - R&J aren't even old enough to drive in contemporary society - though in Antony and Cleopatra, one cannot help but think that two people of their age really ought to know better. At least R&J have the excuse of "young and stupid."
Ultimately, though, it isn't the works or their authors who drive me insane. It's the cultural response. We name our children and our pets after Romeo and Juliet, we happily quote "Quite frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn," as though it were the most romantic mantra in the world, and we get starry-eyed over the great love of Antony and Cleopatra.
Wake up, people. Scarlett and Rhett made out the best of the lot, because at least they LIVED. Romeo, Juliet, Antony, and Cleopatra all DIED. By dagger and sword and snake. Dead. All of them. Not exactly a fairy-tale ending.
And you know what? They don't get to live happily ever after. They don't achieve the fulfillment of their love because they're dead. Death is not a good way to go about finding love. In fact, it's pretty much the best way to not find it at all.
So when the editors of the edition of Antony and Cleopatra suggest that Antony and Cleopatra win in the end because their love allows them to transcend the petty concerns of the world... I call bullsh*t.
Antony and Cleopatra caused widespread war, neglect, civil and international conflict, infidelity, slavery, and an epidemic of suicide (Enobarbus, Eros, Charmian, Iras, to say nothing about themselves). They were screwups of royal proportions. So don't go immortalizing their love story as if it were the great lauding of love. It's not. It's about how two daft people should not let their privates govern their countries. You can't even definitively prove they did love each other. Only that the gratification of their private desires completely screwed both Rome and Egypt and only got hauled back out of the muck because Caesar Octavian was a serious bad*ss.
Ah, yes. The joys of love. The complete obliteration of all you've ever worked for so you can stab yourself dejectedly when some strumpet fakes her own death, only to discover she's not dead at all, and then you die anyway. Oh, yeah, she dies, too. And so do your friends. And her friends. And then the guy you were fighting wins.
Personally, I'd rather not.
These two of Shakespeare's - along with, let's say, Gone with the Wind - are perhaps the ones that aggravate me the most. It is not that they are poorly written or badly presented. Not at all. It's the placid insipidity of the characters and their utterly irrational behavior that drives me insane.
Like Jane Austen's Eleanor of Sense and Sensibility, I do not see the point of dying for love, unlike her more emotional sister Marianne, who can think of nothing more grand. I just don't see the beauty of dying for love. Dying to protect those you love, certainly. But dying for love betrays a kind of insipid and ignorant melodrama.
But I - as has often been determined - am cold and dead inside. I was never happier during my reading of Gone with the Wind than when Rhett walked out. The best part of Madame Bovary was when Emma finally died the horrible death she deserved. I desperately wanted Gwendolen of Daniel Deronda to drown when she was shoved off the boat. If Romeo had been killed by Tybalt at the beginning of the play, or if Rosaline had opened her bloody window, or if that plague Mercutio mentions had struck a little earlier... You get the idea.
I am particularly vexed by melodrama in young love - R&J aren't even old enough to drive in contemporary society - though in Antony and Cleopatra, one cannot help but think that two people of their age really ought to know better. At least R&J have the excuse of "young and stupid."
Ultimately, though, it isn't the works or their authors who drive me insane. It's the cultural response. We name our children and our pets after Romeo and Juliet, we happily quote "Quite frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn," as though it were the most romantic mantra in the world, and we get starry-eyed over the great love of Antony and Cleopatra.
Wake up, people. Scarlett and Rhett made out the best of the lot, because at least they LIVED. Romeo, Juliet, Antony, and Cleopatra all DIED. By dagger and sword and snake. Dead. All of them. Not exactly a fairy-tale ending.
And you know what? They don't get to live happily ever after. They don't achieve the fulfillment of their love because they're dead. Death is not a good way to go about finding love. In fact, it's pretty much the best way to not find it at all.
So when the editors of the edition of Antony and Cleopatra suggest that Antony and Cleopatra win in the end because their love allows them to transcend the petty concerns of the world... I call bullsh*t.
Antony and Cleopatra caused widespread war, neglect, civil and international conflict, infidelity, slavery, and an epidemic of suicide (Enobarbus, Eros, Charmian, Iras, to say nothing about themselves). They were screwups of royal proportions. So don't go immortalizing their love story as if it were the great lauding of love. It's not. It's about how two daft people should not let their privates govern their countries. You can't even definitively prove they did love each other. Only that the gratification of their private desires completely screwed both Rome and Egypt and only got hauled back out of the muck because Caesar Octavian was a serious bad*ss.
Ah, yes. The joys of love. The complete obliteration of all you've ever worked for so you can stab yourself dejectedly when some strumpet fakes her own death, only to discover she's not dead at all, and then you die anyway. Oh, yeah, she dies, too. And so do your friends. And her friends. And then the guy you were fighting wins.
Personally, I'd rather not.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Intelligent Design...
As a literary critic and (hopeful) creator, I find myself taking exception not simply to the idea of Intelligent Design in the anti-Darwinian sense, but in a creative sense, as enumerated in Roger Shattuck's Candor and Perversion:
Few of us can resist the wish to put the pieces of the world together, and we give lasting recognition to some, like Jesus, Muhammad, and Gandhi, who convinced many others that they could makes sense of it all. There is nothing original about saying that the widely held belief among artists and writers in a universal unity represents a survival of religion in secularized form. Few of them would reject any connection at all to spiritual experience... R.P. Warren says what most artists, let alone ordinary citizens, would agree with: "I am a man of religious temperament in the modern world who hasn't got any religion." But in fact he does. He practices religion in a diluted form, which we accept as artistic and literary, a poetic faith without worship or ethics. It is difficult to say how long analogy alone will sustain and satisfy us. (49)
I take exception not to Shattuck's (accurate) observation that many people believe "in a universal unity," whether they call it god or a human spirit, but, rather, to 1) the suggestion that an artist/writer expressing anything other than complete nihilism must be religious, and, 2) the implication that "analogy alone" will be incapable of "sustain[ing] and satisfy[ing] us."
First, when Warren says he "hasn't got any religion," he is most likely correct. To say that he "practices religion in a diluted form" is offensive - both to the act of artistic creation (which is not "diluted" in any way) and to the idea that one may be creative without investing in some sort of "religion." Creativity and imagination do not require the existence of religion, deity, or a larger metaphysical plane in order to exist. And to imply that an artist (under which category I include "writer") needs something beyond him or herself in order to produce something of beauty and value is offensive to the artist.
Is creation truly nothing more than "religion in a secularized form"? A positive answer is understandable; after all, for centuries nearly all art was religious in nature. However, does that necessitate that art is religious? Does it mean that simply because an artist works with a religious medium, mythos, or image, that he or she must believe in its supernatural elements? Certainly, no one would suggest that simply because an artist painted a picture of a minotaur that he or she believes the minotaur is real.
And this leads, finally, to my counter-question. Why cannot "analogy alone... sustain and satisfy us"? We think, reason, and dream in analogies. We relate to one another in terms of metaphor and simile, we recognize our emotions in images and words that are not the things we think of upon viewing them. Why may not an "analogy" satisfy our creative, our emotional, or rational minds? After all, if I am right, then the greatest religions in the world have made a millennia-long practice of sustaining and satisfying with nothing more than "analogy alone."
So why do we constantly attempt to mitigate our own talents and creations? Why do we, as a species, constantly attribute our art, our skills, our talents, to the intervention or blessing of a deity? Quite simply, because of fear. Because our society recognizes a kind of selfless ecstasy in the act of imaginative creation, and is afraid to attribute that kind of raw and unmitigated power to a mere human being. Because if we acknowledge that we are capable of Creation, then we become gods. And if we are gods, then we must accept not only the power, but the responsibility that accompanies it. And if we accept that responsibility, then we must acknowledge that, as the gods of ourselves and our world, we have been terrible gods indeed.
Few of us can resist the wish to put the pieces of the world together, and we give lasting recognition to some, like Jesus, Muhammad, and Gandhi, who convinced many others that they could makes sense of it all. There is nothing original about saying that the widely held belief among artists and writers in a universal unity represents a survival of religion in secularized form. Few of them would reject any connection at all to spiritual experience... R.P. Warren says what most artists, let alone ordinary citizens, would agree with: "I am a man of religious temperament in the modern world who hasn't got any religion." But in fact he does. He practices religion in a diluted form, which we accept as artistic and literary, a poetic faith without worship or ethics. It is difficult to say how long analogy alone will sustain and satisfy us. (49)
I take exception not to Shattuck's (accurate) observation that many people believe "in a universal unity," whether they call it god or a human spirit, but, rather, to 1) the suggestion that an artist/writer expressing anything other than complete nihilism must be religious, and, 2) the implication that "analogy alone" will be incapable of "sustain[ing] and satisfy[ing] us."
First, when Warren says he "hasn't got any religion," he is most likely correct. To say that he "practices religion in a diluted form" is offensive - both to the act of artistic creation (which is not "diluted" in any way) and to the idea that one may be creative without investing in some sort of "religion." Creativity and imagination do not require the existence of religion, deity, or a larger metaphysical plane in order to exist. And to imply that an artist (under which category I include "writer") needs something beyond him or herself in order to produce something of beauty and value is offensive to the artist.
Is creation truly nothing more than "religion in a secularized form"? A positive answer is understandable; after all, for centuries nearly all art was religious in nature. However, does that necessitate that art is religious? Does it mean that simply because an artist works with a religious medium, mythos, or image, that he or she must believe in its supernatural elements? Certainly, no one would suggest that simply because an artist painted a picture of a minotaur that he or she believes the minotaur is real.
And this leads, finally, to my counter-question. Why cannot "analogy alone... sustain and satisfy us"? We think, reason, and dream in analogies. We relate to one another in terms of metaphor and simile, we recognize our emotions in images and words that are not the things we think of upon viewing them. Why may not an "analogy" satisfy our creative, our emotional, or rational minds? After all, if I am right, then the greatest religions in the world have made a millennia-long practice of sustaining and satisfying with nothing more than "analogy alone."
So why do we constantly attempt to mitigate our own talents and creations? Why do we, as a species, constantly attribute our art, our skills, our talents, to the intervention or blessing of a deity? Quite simply, because of fear. Because our society recognizes a kind of selfless ecstasy in the act of imaginative creation, and is afraid to attribute that kind of raw and unmitigated power to a mere human being. Because if we acknowledge that we are capable of Creation, then we become gods. And if we are gods, then we must accept not only the power, but the responsibility that accompanies it. And if we accept that responsibility, then we must acknowledge that, as the gods of ourselves and our world, we have been terrible gods indeed.
Monday, July 28, 2008
The Meaning of Life
Every few months, I - and, I suspect, many others - wonder what, precisely, it is that I'm making out of my life. What it is that I really want to do. Do I want to spend the rest of my life devoted to the largely insular world of academia? Not particularly. Devoted to my students? That I could do.
It brings back, again and again, the recognition that I do what I do because of the students. Not because of the texts, not because of Shakespeare, but because of the students. Because it allows me to teach them how to think critically, not about the texts, but about the world. About what they are told - even by me. I simply use literature as the medium.
But my secret heart - well, perhaps not so secret - wants desperately to create that medium. To create something that will do by itself what I struggle to teach. To change not the world, but minds. Because, ultimately, it is the changing of minds that will change the world.
And the thing to which I come back, every time, is the idea that there is no binary. There can be no binary in a world made of color and light and sound and touch. And that those who live with binaries ultimately condemn themselves to exactly that which they hate and fear.
This is not a new point. I do not claim it is. However, it is one that needs revisitation. There are thousands, perhaps millions, of people who do not recognize the hypocrisy inherent in themselves, in their religion, and in the ideologies they purport. I hope, someday, to see a majority of rational, thoughtful people who are able to place their faith in their own logic rather than in something external to themselves. Whether they want to call that part of themselves god or reason is unimportant, but until we as a species stop attributing right and wrong based on illogical and hallucinatory fairy tales, we will not be able to work as a cohesive species.
It brings back, again and again, the recognition that I do what I do because of the students. Not because of the texts, not because of Shakespeare, but because of the students. Because it allows me to teach them how to think critically, not about the texts, but about the world. About what they are told - even by me. I simply use literature as the medium.
But my secret heart - well, perhaps not so secret - wants desperately to create that medium. To create something that will do by itself what I struggle to teach. To change not the world, but minds. Because, ultimately, it is the changing of minds that will change the world.
And the thing to which I come back, every time, is the idea that there is no binary. There can be no binary in a world made of color and light and sound and touch. And that those who live with binaries ultimately condemn themselves to exactly that which they hate and fear.
This is not a new point. I do not claim it is. However, it is one that needs revisitation. There are thousands, perhaps millions, of people who do not recognize the hypocrisy inherent in themselves, in their religion, and in the ideologies they purport. I hope, someday, to see a majority of rational, thoughtful people who are able to place their faith in their own logic rather than in something external to themselves. Whether they want to call that part of themselves god or reason is unimportant, but until we as a species stop attributing right and wrong based on illogical and hallucinatory fairy tales, we will not be able to work as a cohesive species.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Nothing More Than Feelings
I've noticed an alarming trend of late in student writings, and, it appears, in our educational system: the permissiveness and even encouragement of treating our "feelings" as though they were valid sources of fact and argument. This is, "I feel," complete crap. As an academic, I view it as a degradation of the art of interpretation.
It is part - or is at least an off-shoot of - the increasing validity of reader-response. Which is itself the bastard child of New Criticism. Both of which, "I feel," should be dragged out back and shot.
We, especially here in the United States of America, want our feelings to be given credence and importance that they do not deserve. This is, of course, not to say that feelings aren't important. They are. In social relationships. Not in my classroom, thank you very much.
I am not one of those teachers who belittles her students. I am respectful of them and I expect them to be the same of one another and of me. I do not try to hurt their feelings and I go out of my way to make sure that any and all criticism I offer them is constructive. But what they "feel" about Shakespeare has no place in their papers.
I'm glad Shakespeare makes them feel something. I'm glad that Eliot was right about the objective correlative. But I don't care. And not only do I not care, I actively do not want to know how they feel about Hamlet and Gertrude or Romeo and Juliet. What I want to know is what they have discovered within the text. And since the entire purpose of education is to encourage thought, I don't think I have unrealistic expectations.
The problem is that they are being encouraged in high school to tell me what they feel. To tell me that they agree with Machiavelli, or that they think Machiavelli is going to Hell. I. Don't. Care. Go right ahead and think it, but it does not belong in any serious treatment of the text. This isn't about what you "feel." Life does not care what you "feel." I don't care. The text doesn't care if it hurt your feelings or if you disagree with it.
The entire purpose of critical thinking, of interpretation, of analysis, is to find things that are intrinsic to the text. If you can link that to its contemporary history, great. If you want to link it to other historical, literary, philosophical, etc. circumstances, great. But don't tell me "I agree with Machiavelli that rulers need to be deceptive." Unless you, sir or madam student, are a political authority, historian, or literary giant, your opinion doesn't count. Show me that Machiavelli is jaded and bitter over the corruption of political office. Show me that he contradicts himself. Show me how idiots in office took him seriously without realizing that they're proving the very things he satirizes. But don't tell me you "agree" or - god forbid - that you don't think rulers can be deceptive anymore because of the internet. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a-whole-nother kettle of fish.
What really drives me crazy - in case you couldn't tell - is our society's penchant for wanting to make everyone's "feelings" important. I don't want to have to pussy-foot around an issue simply because it might "hurt someone's feelings" to have it addressed. I want to be able to say "it drives me crazy when everyone assumes I'm a lesbian" without worrying about offending lesbians. I mean no offense to lesbians. But I'm not one. It's just like saying "it drives me crazy when everyone assumes I'm a man." I'm just not, no matter what the guy who told me I look like Dustin Hoffman in Tootsie thinks.
Have your feelings, kids, but recognize that you'll be a whole heck of a lot better off if you learn that feelings aren't worth a damn (except, as I said, in social relationships). Because, boys and girls, no matter how much you "feel" that Hamlet shouldn't die or Romeo and Juliet was written to you personally, it just isn't true. Feelings can lie to us. They're unreliable, variable, and very often quite stupid. Yes, they can also be wonderful, life-changing, fabulous things. But they belong between you and your family, your friends, your lover. They do not, I repeat, do not belong in the world of facts and critical thought. Maybe I am, as a dear friend so often insists, "dead inside." But, please, relegate your feelings to their proper place and let your brain get a little more exercise.
It is part - or is at least an off-shoot of - the increasing validity of reader-response. Which is itself the bastard child of New Criticism. Both of which, "I feel," should be dragged out back and shot.
We, especially here in the United States of America, want our feelings to be given credence and importance that they do not deserve. This is, of course, not to say that feelings aren't important. They are. In social relationships. Not in my classroom, thank you very much.
I am not one of those teachers who belittles her students. I am respectful of them and I expect them to be the same of one another and of me. I do not try to hurt their feelings and I go out of my way to make sure that any and all criticism I offer them is constructive. But what they "feel" about Shakespeare has no place in their papers.
I'm glad Shakespeare makes them feel something. I'm glad that Eliot was right about the objective correlative. But I don't care. And not only do I not care, I actively do not want to know how they feel about Hamlet and Gertrude or Romeo and Juliet. What I want to know is what they have discovered within the text. And since the entire purpose of education is to encourage thought, I don't think I have unrealistic expectations.
The problem is that they are being encouraged in high school to tell me what they feel. To tell me that they agree with Machiavelli, or that they think Machiavelli is going to Hell. I. Don't. Care. Go right ahead and think it, but it does not belong in any serious treatment of the text. This isn't about what you "feel." Life does not care what you "feel." I don't care. The text doesn't care if it hurt your feelings or if you disagree with it.
The entire purpose of critical thinking, of interpretation, of analysis, is to find things that are intrinsic to the text. If you can link that to its contemporary history, great. If you want to link it to other historical, literary, philosophical, etc. circumstances, great. But don't tell me "I agree with Machiavelli that rulers need to be deceptive." Unless you, sir or madam student, are a political authority, historian, or literary giant, your opinion doesn't count. Show me that Machiavelli is jaded and bitter over the corruption of political office. Show me that he contradicts himself. Show me how idiots in office took him seriously without realizing that they're proving the very things he satirizes. But don't tell me you "agree" or - god forbid - that you don't think rulers can be deceptive anymore because of the internet. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a-whole-nother kettle of fish.
What really drives me crazy - in case you couldn't tell - is our society's penchant for wanting to make everyone's "feelings" important. I don't want to have to pussy-foot around an issue simply because it might "hurt someone's feelings" to have it addressed. I want to be able to say "it drives me crazy when everyone assumes I'm a lesbian" without worrying about offending lesbians. I mean no offense to lesbians. But I'm not one. It's just like saying "it drives me crazy when everyone assumes I'm a man." I'm just not, no matter what the guy who told me I look like Dustin Hoffman in Tootsie thinks.
Have your feelings, kids, but recognize that you'll be a whole heck of a lot better off if you learn that feelings aren't worth a damn (except, as I said, in social relationships). Because, boys and girls, no matter how much you "feel" that Hamlet shouldn't die or Romeo and Juliet was written to you personally, it just isn't true. Feelings can lie to us. They're unreliable, variable, and very often quite stupid. Yes, they can also be wonderful, life-changing, fabulous things. But they belong between you and your family, your friends, your lover. They do not, I repeat, do not belong in the world of facts and critical thought. Maybe I am, as a dear friend so often insists, "dead inside." But, please, relegate your feelings to their proper place and let your brain get a little more exercise.
Wednesday, July 09, 2008
On the Interpretation of...
We, as a species, often find ourselves in the position of interpreters. It is our nature to interpret - not simply on the most basic level of language, but on so many various sublevels. We read one another - body language, tone, expression, eyes. We interpret these extralinguistic cues on a daily basis - and we believe them, often more readily than we believe the language that accompanies them.
We are accomplished liars, but we are also accomplished interpreters. Often, we seek answers in places other than in language in our day-to-day interactions, reading things other than words.
And we reproduce these signs and symbols, both the linguistic and the extralinguistic, in art. Certainly, literature is the art of language. There is nothing more linguistically pure than literature (drama excepted - it gets its own category). It is composed entirely of words. Words that lie. Words that speak truth. Words that do both at once. Words that delve into the essence of human nature, rife with ambiguity and impossible layers. But these words so often invoke the other aspects of interpretation - descriptions of bodies, of voices, of colors, of all the sources of sensory input upon which we rely. All put into words. Limited. Exploded. Infinite.
No wonder we, as readers, are always interpreters. Even if unconsciously, we must interpret words on a page. Is this serious? Sarcastic? Sad? But, as interpreters, we also skew that which we choose to interpret. Stephen Leo Carr and Peggy A. Knapp write that as we interpret, "We make the text over, rewriting it in our own image so that it seems to anticipate and validate that image" (838).*
For so many, the act of interpretive reading - and all reading is interpretive, whether consciously done or not - is the act of assigning one's own value systems, one's own ideology, to the text. It is an act of penetration, of violation, that attempts to conform characters and themes to the familiar and, often, the agreeable. We grow disturbed by a text when we cannot force it to agree with our views. We choose to dislike it, labeling it as "bad," despite its probable virtues. This is a crime of which teachers are most often accused.
It is something we do not only to books, but to movies, to music, and to people. When a person does not conform to our desires for them, we dislike them.
I do not suppose that there is anything wrong with this. I dislike many things, and many people. But my dislike should not make them inherently "bad." While there are things that are inherently "bad" - murderers and Harlequin romances spring to mind - there are more that we simply dislike for their unwillingness to conform to our "image."
But, as has so often been said, variety is the spice of life. We would not like it - no matter how much we think we would - if everything in the world conformed to our "image." We might like it if everything were "good," we would still desire difference - or, in the Derridian sense, differance. We like conflict. We like the clashing of ideologies. What we do not like is their ultimate destruction.
So pause. Take a moment, the next time you dislike something, to determine whether it really is "bad," or whether it is simply an "image" in which you do not wish to see your own reflection.
*Carr, Stephen Leo and Peggy A. Knapp. "Seeing through Macbeth." Publications of the Modern Language Association 96.5 (1981): 837-847.
We are accomplished liars, but we are also accomplished interpreters. Often, we seek answers in places other than in language in our day-to-day interactions, reading things other than words.
And we reproduce these signs and symbols, both the linguistic and the extralinguistic, in art. Certainly, literature is the art of language. There is nothing more linguistically pure than literature (drama excepted - it gets its own category). It is composed entirely of words. Words that lie. Words that speak truth. Words that do both at once. Words that delve into the essence of human nature, rife with ambiguity and impossible layers. But these words so often invoke the other aspects of interpretation - descriptions of bodies, of voices, of colors, of all the sources of sensory input upon which we rely. All put into words. Limited. Exploded. Infinite.
No wonder we, as readers, are always interpreters. Even if unconsciously, we must interpret words on a page. Is this serious? Sarcastic? Sad? But, as interpreters, we also skew that which we choose to interpret. Stephen Leo Carr and Peggy A. Knapp write that as we interpret, "We make the text over, rewriting it in our own image so that it seems to anticipate and validate that image" (838).*
For so many, the act of interpretive reading - and all reading is interpretive, whether consciously done or not - is the act of assigning one's own value systems, one's own ideology, to the text. It is an act of penetration, of violation, that attempts to conform characters and themes to the familiar and, often, the agreeable. We grow disturbed by a text when we cannot force it to agree with our views. We choose to dislike it, labeling it as "bad," despite its probable virtues. This is a crime of which teachers are most often accused.
It is something we do not only to books, but to movies, to music, and to people. When a person does not conform to our desires for them, we dislike them.
I do not suppose that there is anything wrong with this. I dislike many things, and many people. But my dislike should not make them inherently "bad." While there are things that are inherently "bad" - murderers and Harlequin romances spring to mind - there are more that we simply dislike for their unwillingness to conform to our "image."
But, as has so often been said, variety is the spice of life. We would not like it - no matter how much we think we would - if everything in the world conformed to our "image." We might like it if everything were "good," we would still desire difference - or, in the Derridian sense, differance. We like conflict. We like the clashing of ideologies. What we do not like is their ultimate destruction.
So pause. Take a moment, the next time you dislike something, to determine whether it really is "bad," or whether it is simply an "image" in which you do not wish to see your own reflection.
*Carr, Stephen Leo and Peggy A. Knapp. "Seeing through Macbeth." Publications of the Modern Language Association 96.5 (1981): 837-847.
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
My Country, 'Tis of Thee
It's approaching the anniversary of our nation's declaration of independence, the one day out of the year that the entire population (more or less) feels obliged to wear red, white, and blue; to wave flags; to run about stuffing their faces with both food and drink while saying "God bless America." The time of year when those of us in the tourist industry in colonial cities gear up for the influx of patriotic visitors seeking something extra-special and extra-American. Good, clean, wholesome family fun.
The time of year when the site at which I work digs out a Union Jack and prepares to badmouth the historic Patriots. We tell the other side of the story. Which, I might note, is both interesting and horrid.
As children, we learn about "no taxation without representation," about the protests against British imperial rule, about the Liberty Tree and Paul Revere's famous Midnight Ride (except we don't learn about William Dawes or poor Samuel Prescott). We don't learn just how horrifying being tarred and feathered is (think second and third degree burns over your whole body); how the Patriots lied and stole their way to independence; about the lootings and burnings of Tory houses; about the murders and executions of Tory Loyalists; or about the massive financial and psychological hardships endured by those who believed themselves doing nothing more than being loyal to their King.
That's my job. I - and my staff - tell the other side of the story.
Most of the time, people think it's really interesting. Sometimes, you see them grow a little bit horrified at the thought of what their beloved Patriots (particularly the smuggling pirate John Hancock) were up to. You see them realizing that the British citizens forced out of the colonies were suffering, too.
An hour or a day later, of course, these lessons and memories fade, but for a little while, at least, they recognize that there are always two sides to every story. There are always victims, even - especially - in the greatest of victories. That nothing new can be born without bloodshed.
I have no problem with patriotism. What I have a problem with is blind patriotism. With beliefs that disallow the questioning of the dominant ideological paradigm simply because it is dominant. With the automatic vilification of the Other Side. Love your country, but don't hate all others. Don't create a cookie-cutter image of the "American" and antagonize everything that doesn't fit into it.
Our country was born out of diversity, forged in the heat of a war of rebellion, and tempered by blood and gunpowder. We as a nation came about precisely because we were able to reject the strictures we found suffocating. Our founding fathers did not make this nation so that it might stifle itself under dictates of what we must think or speak or feel.
Love your country. But love it as a parent - firmly, sternly, and with the knowledge that when it needs correction, it is better to correct than to allow it to become uncontrollable. Love it as an audience - applaud its good performances, but when it fails, boo it from the stage. Love it as a child - recognize that it has brought us this far, but that we cannot forever remain under its strict control; respect it, but recognize that change, that evolution, is necessary to life; remember that it has loved and nurtured us, but know that it has come to need our care.
The time of year when the site at which I work digs out a Union Jack and prepares to badmouth the historic Patriots. We tell the other side of the story. Which, I might note, is both interesting and horrid.
As children, we learn about "no taxation without representation," about the protests against British imperial rule, about the Liberty Tree and Paul Revere's famous Midnight Ride (except we don't learn about William Dawes or poor Samuel Prescott). We don't learn just how horrifying being tarred and feathered is (think second and third degree burns over your whole body); how the Patriots lied and stole their way to independence; about the lootings and burnings of Tory houses; about the murders and executions of Tory Loyalists; or about the massive financial and psychological hardships endured by those who believed themselves doing nothing more than being loyal to their King.
That's my job. I - and my staff - tell the other side of the story.
Most of the time, people think it's really interesting. Sometimes, you see them grow a little bit horrified at the thought of what their beloved Patriots (particularly the smuggling pirate John Hancock) were up to. You see them realizing that the British citizens forced out of the colonies were suffering, too.
An hour or a day later, of course, these lessons and memories fade, but for a little while, at least, they recognize that there are always two sides to every story. There are always victims, even - especially - in the greatest of victories. That nothing new can be born without bloodshed.
I have no problem with patriotism. What I have a problem with is blind patriotism. With beliefs that disallow the questioning of the dominant ideological paradigm simply because it is dominant. With the automatic vilification of the Other Side. Love your country, but don't hate all others. Don't create a cookie-cutter image of the "American" and antagonize everything that doesn't fit into it.
Our country was born out of diversity, forged in the heat of a war of rebellion, and tempered by blood and gunpowder. We as a nation came about precisely because we were able to reject the strictures we found suffocating. Our founding fathers did not make this nation so that it might stifle itself under dictates of what we must think or speak or feel.
Love your country. But love it as a parent - firmly, sternly, and with the knowledge that when it needs correction, it is better to correct than to allow it to become uncontrollable. Love it as an audience - applaud its good performances, but when it fails, boo it from the stage. Love it as a child - recognize that it has brought us this far, but that we cannot forever remain under its strict control; respect it, but recognize that change, that evolution, is necessary to life; remember that it has loved and nurtured us, but know that it has come to need our care.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
The Book of Martyrs
I've recently been reading about the Jesuit missions to England in the 16th and early 17th centuries, specifically, as they relate to the Gunpowder Plot. I find it interesting how the majority of the authors I've picked up seem so sympathetic toward the Jesuits, and critical of the Elizabethan/Jacobean governments.
Is it that we, as a society, tend to automatically vilify the dominant regime? To root, as it were, for the underdog? The Jesuits lost in England - not only did they not succeed in converting the nation back to Catholicism, they failed to assassinate Elizabeth and to blow up James (though to be fair, most of them weren't out to blow up anything). Underdogs. But... not really. The Catholic Church isn't much of an underdog. And yet it occupies a strangely liminal position between supremacy and oppression.
That particular role, it seems, centers around the concept of the martyr.
Martyrs are attractive. The notion of self-sacrifice for a cause, the willingness to give up even one's life in the pursuit of a noble idealism, is lauded, praised, and sanctified by our national and religious cultures. "So-and-so died for his/her beliefs/country" is the highest of praise.
I wonder. If our biological ancestors had been into self-sacrifice, our species very likely wouldn't exist (with the notable exceptions of dying to save one's young or the rest of one's pack).
In The Lion's Court, Derek Wilson suggests that “Martyrs are seldom made by events. There has to be something deep within a man’s soul to prepare him for, or impel him towards, the ultimate sacrifice... To welcome death in a righteous cause was the surest way to avoid the everlasting torments prepared for the worldly. There is always an element of selfishness about the martyr’s preoccupation with his own eternal well-being” (377-378). I find his point about selfishness to be particularly interesting.
As did the Jesuits. And - as I learned at a session at Kalamazoo this year - the missionaries to the Muslim East in medieval times. The latter were much disposed to going to the Middle East with the specific intention of getting killed. Sure-fire one-way ticket to heaven. How do we know this? Because as long as the missionaries in question didn't preach close to a mosque (in the instances recounted in the paper), they'd be left more or less alone. They chose to do so anyway. They were disemboweled, decapitated, etc. No surprise to anyone. The Papacy elected to stop canonizing them - and to discourage the praise of said individuals - to keep more people from going out and dying. Same deal in England with the Jesuit missions; they actively encouraged people NOT to go unless they felt that the priests in question were capable of deception and espionage.
But that never seems to stop people. People want to become martyrs. And why?
I have to say that here is one of those points at which my atheism leads to my incredulity. Perhaps if I believed in another, spiritual life, a reward, a heaven, martyrdom would make more sense. As it is, I just don't get it. Martyrdom seems such a waste. Why give your life for something when you could devote the time and energy of that life TO it?
Is it that we, as a society, tend to automatically vilify the dominant regime? To root, as it were, for the underdog? The Jesuits lost in England - not only did they not succeed in converting the nation back to Catholicism, they failed to assassinate Elizabeth and to blow up James (though to be fair, most of them weren't out to blow up anything). Underdogs. But... not really. The Catholic Church isn't much of an underdog. And yet it occupies a strangely liminal position between supremacy and oppression.
That particular role, it seems, centers around the concept of the martyr.
Martyrs are attractive. The notion of self-sacrifice for a cause, the willingness to give up even one's life in the pursuit of a noble idealism, is lauded, praised, and sanctified by our national and religious cultures. "So-and-so died for his/her beliefs/country" is the highest of praise.
I wonder. If our biological ancestors had been into self-sacrifice, our species very likely wouldn't exist (with the notable exceptions of dying to save one's young or the rest of one's pack).
In The Lion's Court, Derek Wilson suggests that “Martyrs are seldom made by events. There has to be something deep within a man’s soul to prepare him for, or impel him towards, the ultimate sacrifice... To welcome death in a righteous cause was the surest way to avoid the everlasting torments prepared for the worldly. There is always an element of selfishness about the martyr’s preoccupation with his own eternal well-being” (377-378). I find his point about selfishness to be particularly interesting.
As did the Jesuits. And - as I learned at a session at Kalamazoo this year - the missionaries to the Muslim East in medieval times. The latter were much disposed to going to the Middle East with the specific intention of getting killed. Sure-fire one-way ticket to heaven. How do we know this? Because as long as the missionaries in question didn't preach close to a mosque (in the instances recounted in the paper), they'd be left more or less alone. They chose to do so anyway. They were disemboweled, decapitated, etc. No surprise to anyone. The Papacy elected to stop canonizing them - and to discourage the praise of said individuals - to keep more people from going out and dying. Same deal in England with the Jesuit missions; they actively encouraged people NOT to go unless they felt that the priests in question were capable of deception and espionage.
But that never seems to stop people. People want to become martyrs. And why?
I have to say that here is one of those points at which my atheism leads to my incredulity. Perhaps if I believed in another, spiritual life, a reward, a heaven, martyrdom would make more sense. As it is, I just don't get it. Martyrdom seems such a waste. Why give your life for something when you could devote the time and energy of that life TO it?
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Shakespeare, he is good.
There is a reason we still, after 400 years, read Shakespeare. And it's not because he's a dead, white male. He is, but that isn't why we read him. The man had a gift. I hesitate to say "genius," if only because that is a word charged with so much angst and excuse, but Shakespeare, he is good.
Some of Shakespeare, of course, is not good. Some of it is downright terrible (and yes, I still think the terrible bits are Shakespeare, too, despite what certain *ahem* editors out there tend to argue). But that does not change the fact that the man was an intellectual giant.
What I perhaps love the most about Shakespeare is the fact that he became what he became simply because he was so damn good at what he did. Not because he was highly trained (he wasn't) or educated (he wasn't that either) or born into the right family (nope, still not).1 He was just plain and simple good at what he did. It didn't matter that his spelling was terrible or that he made up new words (we like that about him). He wrote what he saw, and when he saw, he understood. He recognized the patterns and the passions in the world and put them into a language that translates into performance as well as writing. He saw the intrinsically human, the universally recognized, the basest and greatest drives we possess, and he translated them into something that survived for centuries.
All this is, of course, instigated by my dissertation, about which I will not write. But suffice it to say that today I found yet another pattern, a perfect circularity, a flawless symmetry that made me recognize that what so many critics view as a "flaw" is, in fact, no such thing. It is deliberate and elegant. And it works. It reaches out off the stage and grabs us by the ruff and shakes us, it makes us feel something we should not feel, forces us to recognize in the most pathetic of figures the beautiful contradiction that is the human condition. It causes in us the same epiphany we have just witnessed - and the most glorious part is that we are not told what to think. We are shown. The scene is played out before us and it is up to us to recognize what we have seen, to bear witness to the passing of a man who has only just learned how to become great. To mourn his death, but to revel in it, because it is only through this single scene that he could become what he has just become. And it is great, and it is terrible.
And it is what makes us question whether we, too, can be both saint and sinner. Whether we, like this figure before us, have the capacity to be at once so mighty and so fallen. We are, it tells us, flawed. But we are also great.
1.[This is supposing, of course, that William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon is the playwright rather than the Earl of Oxford or Francis Bacon or Elizabeth I or Christopher Marlowe or whatever-other-monkey-they've-come-up-with-this-week. Not to say that some of those figures don't have a case... Oxford in particular is an intriguing suggestion, though I do have to note that both Elizabeth and Marlowe died before Shakespeare stopped writing. And don't give me crap about "they found it later," because those later plays were referring to contemporary historical events.]
Some of Shakespeare, of course, is not good. Some of it is downright terrible (and yes, I still think the terrible bits are Shakespeare, too, despite what certain *ahem* editors out there tend to argue). But that does not change the fact that the man was an intellectual giant.
What I perhaps love the most about Shakespeare is the fact that he became what he became simply because he was so damn good at what he did. Not because he was highly trained (he wasn't) or educated (he wasn't that either) or born into the right family (nope, still not).1 He was just plain and simple good at what he did. It didn't matter that his spelling was terrible or that he made up new words (we like that about him). He wrote what he saw, and when he saw, he understood. He recognized the patterns and the passions in the world and put them into a language that translates into performance as well as writing. He saw the intrinsically human, the universally recognized, the basest and greatest drives we possess, and he translated them into something that survived for centuries.
All this is, of course, instigated by my dissertation, about which I will not write. But suffice it to say that today I found yet another pattern, a perfect circularity, a flawless symmetry that made me recognize that what so many critics view as a "flaw" is, in fact, no such thing. It is deliberate and elegant. And it works. It reaches out off the stage and grabs us by the ruff and shakes us, it makes us feel something we should not feel, forces us to recognize in the most pathetic of figures the beautiful contradiction that is the human condition. It causes in us the same epiphany we have just witnessed - and the most glorious part is that we are not told what to think. We are shown. The scene is played out before us and it is up to us to recognize what we have seen, to bear witness to the passing of a man who has only just learned how to become great. To mourn his death, but to revel in it, because it is only through this single scene that he could become what he has just become. And it is great, and it is terrible.
And it is what makes us question whether we, too, can be both saint and sinner. Whether we, like this figure before us, have the capacity to be at once so mighty and so fallen. We are, it tells us, flawed. But we are also great.
1.[This is supposing, of course, that William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon is the playwright rather than the Earl of Oxford or Francis Bacon or Elizabeth I or Christopher Marlowe or whatever-other-monkey-they've-come-up-with-this-week. Not to say that some of those figures don't have a case... Oxford in particular is an intriguing suggestion, though I do have to note that both Elizabeth and Marlowe died before Shakespeare stopped writing. And don't give me crap about "they found it later," because those later plays were referring to contemporary historical events.]
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
Revisiting History
I've been reading a good deal of history lately - and along with it, some historical fiction. Sets the brain cells a-churning.
The most recent book to have filtered its way through my brain is C.J. Sansom's Dissolution, purchased on a whim at Kalamazoo. It's set in Tudor England under Henry VIII just following the death of Jane Seymour (that's after the Reformation and after the execution of Anne Boleyn for those of you who don't keep tabs on 1500s England). The subject, rather unsurprisingly, is the dissolution of a monastery - more specifically, the dissolution of a monastery following a series of gruesome (of course) murders which must be solved by the main character.
When I started it, I hated it. I thought the writing was flat and uninteresting. But, since I was on a plane, I made myself keep going. Turns out it was one of those books that gets you hooked and then you can't put it down. And it was well-researched, as I'm discovering in reading Derek Wilson's In the Lion's Court, which is about the reign of Henry VIII.
But that's not the point. The point is that we have - as a friend and I talked about a couple weeks ago - this fascination with the early modern period in England. Henry VIII, Mary, and Elizabeth, to be specific.
Sure, there are reasons. Henry's six wives, the Henrician Reformation, the Golden Age of England... But, as my friend pointed out, we don't seem to be nearly as interested in one of the most ground-breaking and soul-shattering instances in English history: the public execution of Charles I.
Why is that? What do we find so utterly fascinating about Henry and his two daughters that we don't find in Charles? There was depravity, disillusionment, and corruption in the Caroline court. Religious upheaval, even a civil war. But we're drawn to the Tudor dynasty like flies to honey. And believe me, the Stuarts have their fair share of scandal and strangeness. But we aren't interested in them.
Is it charisma? The figure of the magnificent, leontine Henry VIII, strutting about in his ruff and puffy sleeves; "Bloody" Mary who executed more people in five years than Elizabeth in forty-five, wearing severe black, subject to cancer and false pregnancy; and Elizabeth, Gloriana, the greatest ruler (supposedly) to ever sit on the throne of England. We can't let go of our fascination with them. TV, movies (Elizabeth, Elizabeth: The Golden Age, The Other Boleyn Girl, The Tudors, Blackadder II), and books (again, The Other Boleyn Girl, Firedrake's Eye, Unicorn's Blood, Six Wives, the list goes on). And that doesn't even mention Shakespeare in Love.
I say - though I'm a bit biased - that it's propaganda. Portraits (Elizabeth had dozens), pamphlets, pageants, progresses, plays, poems (there are an awful lot of Ps there)... all dedicated to the Tudors. Designed and very often censured or sanctioned by them. And this is what has passed to posterity. The images they wanted us to remember. Yes, we also recognize that Henry was something of a nasty bastard, cutting of two of his wives' heads, divorcing one, annulling another. But he was good at what he did. It all comes down to publicity.
And from this, we learn that the power of media is ancient. It isn't that FoxNews has just figured out the influence they have over us (okay, maybe they just figured it out), it's that we the audience has suddenly recognized what the early moderns knew very well: we are subject to the things given to us. To subvert the system, we must recognize it as as system. And once we understand the mechanisms directed toward us, the tools and tricks of the trade, then we can learn to read between the lines... and to write between them.
Shakespeare, Marlowe, Spencer, Chaucer... the list goes on. They all knew how to write between the lines. To contain in something seemingly innocent or propagantist the message that you don't always have to believe what you're told. Sometimes, you should. But simply knowing that the choice is yours to accept or condemn...
It causes a revolution.
The reason we look at Tudor England? Because without the Tudors, I'll bet you anything Charles I would have kept his head.
The most recent book to have filtered its way through my brain is C.J. Sansom's Dissolution, purchased on a whim at Kalamazoo. It's set in Tudor England under Henry VIII just following the death of Jane Seymour (that's after the Reformation and after the execution of Anne Boleyn for those of you who don't keep tabs on 1500s England). The subject, rather unsurprisingly, is the dissolution of a monastery - more specifically, the dissolution of a monastery following a series of gruesome (of course) murders which must be solved by the main character.
When I started it, I hated it. I thought the writing was flat and uninteresting. But, since I was on a plane, I made myself keep going. Turns out it was one of those books that gets you hooked and then you can't put it down. And it was well-researched, as I'm discovering in reading Derek Wilson's In the Lion's Court, which is about the reign of Henry VIII.
But that's not the point. The point is that we have - as a friend and I talked about a couple weeks ago - this fascination with the early modern period in England. Henry VIII, Mary, and Elizabeth, to be specific.
Sure, there are reasons. Henry's six wives, the Henrician Reformation, the Golden Age of England... But, as my friend pointed out, we don't seem to be nearly as interested in one of the most ground-breaking and soul-shattering instances in English history: the public execution of Charles I.
Why is that? What do we find so utterly fascinating about Henry and his two daughters that we don't find in Charles? There was depravity, disillusionment, and corruption in the Caroline court. Religious upheaval, even a civil war. But we're drawn to the Tudor dynasty like flies to honey. And believe me, the Stuarts have their fair share of scandal and strangeness. But we aren't interested in them.
Is it charisma? The figure of the magnificent, leontine Henry VIII, strutting about in his ruff and puffy sleeves; "Bloody" Mary who executed more people in five years than Elizabeth in forty-five, wearing severe black, subject to cancer and false pregnancy; and Elizabeth, Gloriana, the greatest ruler (supposedly) to ever sit on the throne of England. We can't let go of our fascination with them. TV, movies (Elizabeth, Elizabeth: The Golden Age, The Other Boleyn Girl, The Tudors, Blackadder II), and books (again, The Other Boleyn Girl, Firedrake's Eye, Unicorn's Blood, Six Wives, the list goes on). And that doesn't even mention Shakespeare in Love.
I say - though I'm a bit biased - that it's propaganda. Portraits (Elizabeth had dozens), pamphlets, pageants, progresses, plays, poems (there are an awful lot of Ps there)... all dedicated to the Tudors. Designed and very often censured or sanctioned by them. And this is what has passed to posterity. The images they wanted us to remember. Yes, we also recognize that Henry was something of a nasty bastard, cutting of two of his wives' heads, divorcing one, annulling another. But he was good at what he did. It all comes down to publicity.
And from this, we learn that the power of media is ancient. It isn't that FoxNews has just figured out the influence they have over us (okay, maybe they just figured it out), it's that we the audience has suddenly recognized what the early moderns knew very well: we are subject to the things given to us. To subvert the system, we must recognize it as as system. And once we understand the mechanisms directed toward us, the tools and tricks of the trade, then we can learn to read between the lines... and to write between them.
Shakespeare, Marlowe, Spencer, Chaucer... the list goes on. They all knew how to write between the lines. To contain in something seemingly innocent or propagantist the message that you don't always have to believe what you're told. Sometimes, you should. But simply knowing that the choice is yours to accept or condemn...
It causes a revolution.
The reason we look at Tudor England? Because without the Tudors, I'll bet you anything Charles I would have kept his head.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
La Vita Academia
Writing from a Medieval and Renaissance Conference, at which I am surrounded by not just hundreds, but thousands of academics and scholars from all over the globe, I can’t really help but be prompted to think a bit about what it means to be an academic.
My musings began on the flight over. During the second leg of the trip, two men were seated in the row behind me, a older and a younger, seemingly strangers, discussing the younger man’s life and career. He was in aviation administration somehow – this was not of particular interest to me – and was on a trip to visit his girlfriend, who is still in school. When the older gentleman asked what she did, the younger replied “She’s a women’s studies major. But don’t worry, she’s not one of those man-hating types,” to which the other replied, “What the hell do you do with that?” the disdain evident in his tone.
Part of me wanted to turn around and smack them both., but things like laws and federal aviation behavior requirements kept me facing forward and seething invisibly in my seat. While I give the boyfriend kudos for calmly explaining that the girlfriend wants to go into politics, “because that stuff is useful, I guess,” I couldn’t quite give him enough to make me not want to scream. First of all, the caveat – “But don’t worry, she’s not one of those man-hating types” – was both bigoted and entirely unnecessary (she’s dating one, after all). Second of all, he should have enough respect both for her and her choice of career not to be apologetic about her major.
I don’t really blame the other man for wanting to know what career she will enter with the degree (after all, people ask me that all the time, and I’m getting a degree in something nice and non-threatening), but the tone irritated me no end. It was one of those oh-how-cute-the-little-lady-is-getting-an-education tones. The kind that is usually possessed by persons who are under the impression that women belong in the home, making dinner for their menfolk and raising the kids.
And then at the conference I was taught by a female professor how to “shake hands like a man,” because “this is a man’s world, honey, and you got to fight to stay in it.”
I can’t decide which is worse. The chauvinism inherent in the “uneducated masses,” or the self-perpetuating deprecation practiced by women in the profession. We wear masculine-style suits (particularly to job interviews, where, I learned, skirts are a no-no) and blocky clothing designed to hide our figures – so we won’t be distracting. We put on ball-busting attitudes that will, ostensibly, allow us to get ahead. But these are the very things that cause the illusion that we aren’t as good as our male counterparts to be perpetuated.
I’m not exactly the most girly female in the world. But if I want to be girly, then, dammit, let me. Let me earn your respect regardless of whether I act tomboy or butch or fem or frills-and-ponies. I shouldn’t have to – nor should anyone have to – pretend to be something I’m not just to earn the respect I should deserve simply because I’m competent at what I do.
It’s one of the things I generally like about this particular conference. I’m a little out of my time-period, but I enjoy this place because it accepts everybody based on their competence and intelligence, not on what they wear or how “acceptable” they appear. I’ve seen academics here wearing kilts, dresses, period garb, t-shirts and jeans, sundresses, suits, clerical habits, sweats, and – in once case – the weirdest ensemble I’ve ever seen on ANYONE. There’s no pressure to appear or behave in a certain way. Just the expectation that you accord the other people the respect they deserve as people and as scholars. It’s refreshing.
That said, academics are a very strange breed. They live and exist in a world entirely different from the one in which “normal” people operate. They are people to and for whom the historical world is present – as real as the tangible world outside their windows. They’re people who speak a different language and worship different deities than everyone else, people who understand their existence in relation to a past – or even a fiction (as in my case) – they never saw. They worship it like a god, nurture it like a child, and caress it like a lover.
I can think of worse ways to spend our lives.
My musings began on the flight over. During the second leg of the trip, two men were seated in the row behind me, a older and a younger, seemingly strangers, discussing the younger man’s life and career. He was in aviation administration somehow – this was not of particular interest to me – and was on a trip to visit his girlfriend, who is still in school. When the older gentleman asked what she did, the younger replied “She’s a women’s studies major. But don’t worry, she’s not one of those man-hating types,” to which the other replied, “What the hell do you do with that?” the disdain evident in his tone.
Part of me wanted to turn around and smack them both., but things like laws and federal aviation behavior requirements kept me facing forward and seething invisibly in my seat. While I give the boyfriend kudos for calmly explaining that the girlfriend wants to go into politics, “because that stuff is useful, I guess,” I couldn’t quite give him enough to make me not want to scream. First of all, the caveat – “But don’t worry, she’s not one of those man-hating types” – was both bigoted and entirely unnecessary (she’s dating one, after all). Second of all, he should have enough respect both for her and her choice of career not to be apologetic about her major.
I don’t really blame the other man for wanting to know what career she will enter with the degree (after all, people ask me that all the time, and I’m getting a degree in something nice and non-threatening), but the tone irritated me no end. It was one of those oh-how-cute-the-little-lady-is-getting-an-education tones. The kind that is usually possessed by persons who are under the impression that women belong in the home, making dinner for their menfolk and raising the kids.
And then at the conference I was taught by a female professor how to “shake hands like a man,” because “this is a man’s world, honey, and you got to fight to stay in it.”
I can’t decide which is worse. The chauvinism inherent in the “uneducated masses,” or the self-perpetuating deprecation practiced by women in the profession. We wear masculine-style suits (particularly to job interviews, where, I learned, skirts are a no-no) and blocky clothing designed to hide our figures – so we won’t be distracting. We put on ball-busting attitudes that will, ostensibly, allow us to get ahead. But these are the very things that cause the illusion that we aren’t as good as our male counterparts to be perpetuated.
I’m not exactly the most girly female in the world. But if I want to be girly, then, dammit, let me. Let me earn your respect regardless of whether I act tomboy or butch or fem or frills-and-ponies. I shouldn’t have to – nor should anyone have to – pretend to be something I’m not just to earn the respect I should deserve simply because I’m competent at what I do.
It’s one of the things I generally like about this particular conference. I’m a little out of my time-period, but I enjoy this place because it accepts everybody based on their competence and intelligence, not on what they wear or how “acceptable” they appear. I’ve seen academics here wearing kilts, dresses, period garb, t-shirts and jeans, sundresses, suits, clerical habits, sweats, and – in once case – the weirdest ensemble I’ve ever seen on ANYONE. There’s no pressure to appear or behave in a certain way. Just the expectation that you accord the other people the respect they deserve as people and as scholars. It’s refreshing.
That said, academics are a very strange breed. They live and exist in a world entirely different from the one in which “normal” people operate. They are people to and for whom the historical world is present – as real as the tangible world outside their windows. They’re people who speak a different language and worship different deities than everyone else, people who understand their existence in relation to a past – or even a fiction (as in my case) – they never saw. They worship it like a god, nurture it like a child, and caress it like a lover.
I can think of worse ways to spend our lives.
Monday, May 05, 2008
Death and Life
In the spirit of several recent events - and a plethora of student papers - I'm addressing death. The death of people, the death of things, the death of relationships. (No, this has nothing to do with my own personal life.)
Phoebe S. Spinrad writes in The Summons of Death on the Medieval and Renaissance English Stage,
The human mind is afraid of Nothing.
It is at the moment of death that Everything and Nothing meet, and throughout the history of humankind, art has struggled to make them both less frightening by transmuting them into Something, a something that can be borne. (ix)
Spinrad's observation is as applicable to literal death as it is to the figurative deaths that fill our lives. When we experience loss - whether to death, to divorce, to a move - we struggle to find larger meaning or intention. We fear the absence of meaning, of purpose, of design in our lives. We want all our losses to mean something else, something other than - as Spinrad says - Nothing.
Meaning is one of the many reasons people choose to believe in religion. We want to know that our lives have a purpose. That our deaths, our tragedies, will give rise to something larger than ourselves. And sometimes, it does.
Sometimes it is a sign that we have made the wrong choice - of mate, of behavior, of job, of living place. Sometimes it means nothing more than a bad coincidence. But we don't appreciate coincidences. We don't want to think that randomness can cause us hurt and pain. We want our suffering to have greater import than just the randomized stimulation of nerves or emotions.
But we also tend to avoid confronting the possibility of this loss. We don't want to hear when a spouse is cheating, when our behavior could make us sick or injured, when we have been the cause of either our own injury or the neglect that has led to it. We don't want to know when we are at fault.
Nor do we want to know when our own prosperity, our own happiness, has come at the expense of another's pain. And yet it is something in which we participate daily. Often through ignorance, often through deliberate disavowal of our own capabilities. We are a society and a culture that enjoys shadenfreude, that takes pleasure - even humor - in the suffering (physical or psychological) of others.
It is the hypocrisy that I find despicable. The refusal to acknowledge our own animalistic nature, to reconcile ourselves as fierce and ferocious beings with our innate desire for compassion. For we are, ultimately, both compassionate and cruel. We enjoy pain, but we also enjoy its mitigation. We are healers as much as - if not more than - harmers. Ultimately, the kind of pain in which we take pleasure is the kind that passes, the kind that teaches, that makes us stronger.
We are vicious, but we are also gracious. We understand the gains to be discovered in suffering, the advantages to being the stronger, the victor. But we are also infinitely kind, infinitely considerate, infinitely compassionate. We are creatures of contradiction, and creatures whose contradictory natures make our flaws our saving graces. And in this, we find the Something for which we risk the greatest Nothing of all.
Phoebe S. Spinrad writes in The Summons of Death on the Medieval and Renaissance English Stage,
The human mind is afraid of Nothing.
It is at the moment of death that Everything and Nothing meet, and throughout the history of humankind, art has struggled to make them both less frightening by transmuting them into Something, a something that can be borne. (ix)
Spinrad's observation is as applicable to literal death as it is to the figurative deaths that fill our lives. When we experience loss - whether to death, to divorce, to a move - we struggle to find larger meaning or intention. We fear the absence of meaning, of purpose, of design in our lives. We want all our losses to mean something else, something other than - as Spinrad says - Nothing.
Meaning is one of the many reasons people choose to believe in religion. We want to know that our lives have a purpose. That our deaths, our tragedies, will give rise to something larger than ourselves. And sometimes, it does.
Sometimes it is a sign that we have made the wrong choice - of mate, of behavior, of job, of living place. Sometimes it means nothing more than a bad coincidence. But we don't appreciate coincidences. We don't want to think that randomness can cause us hurt and pain. We want our suffering to have greater import than just the randomized stimulation of nerves or emotions.
But we also tend to avoid confronting the possibility of this loss. We don't want to hear when a spouse is cheating, when our behavior could make us sick or injured, when we have been the cause of either our own injury or the neglect that has led to it. We don't want to know when we are at fault.
Nor do we want to know when our own prosperity, our own happiness, has come at the expense of another's pain. And yet it is something in which we participate daily. Often through ignorance, often through deliberate disavowal of our own capabilities. We are a society and a culture that enjoys shadenfreude, that takes pleasure - even humor - in the suffering (physical or psychological) of others.
It is the hypocrisy that I find despicable. The refusal to acknowledge our own animalistic nature, to reconcile ourselves as fierce and ferocious beings with our innate desire for compassion. For we are, ultimately, both compassionate and cruel. We enjoy pain, but we also enjoy its mitigation. We are healers as much as - if not more than - harmers. Ultimately, the kind of pain in which we take pleasure is the kind that passes, the kind that teaches, that makes us stronger.
We are vicious, but we are also gracious. We understand the gains to be discovered in suffering, the advantages to being the stronger, the victor. But we are also infinitely kind, infinitely considerate, infinitely compassionate. We are creatures of contradiction, and creatures whose contradictory natures make our flaws our saving graces. And in this, we find the Something for which we risk the greatest Nothing of all.
Sunday, April 27, 2008
Dreams of Equality
Today, we watched The Colbert Report, the episode where Edwards comes out and does the “edWords” of the day. Putting aside the frequent comments on Jetskis, Edwards rather crudely paraphrased Martin Luther King Jr., stating that he would like to see the day when his children could wake up in a world where economic equality was more than just a fantasy.
It’s a nice thought. But one that – I’m afraid – is an impossibility.
This is not to say that I believe poverty is a necessity. I don’t. I cheered as loud as anybody when feudalism fell. I even think that it is possible to functionally eradicate poverty, at least within the Western World. But I do not think that economic equality is feasible in any way.
We’ve reached the point in the historical timeline when the Cold War has become history. When college students were no longer alive at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and rapidly approaching the time when they won’t have been alive for the fall of the USSR. I remember both. My parents remember Vietnam, my grandparents World War II.
Equality in any sense is a utopian pipe dream. It’s a nice dream, yes. But only a dream. Like Willy Loman’s “well-known.”
I believe that, inherently, people are equal. No skin color or gender or genetics or ethnicity or sexual preference is inherently better or worse than any other. People are equal.
Society is not. Class, status, education, employment. All these are divisive and discordant. They rank us by our grades, by our height, our weight, our standardized test performance, our salaries. They look at the industries in which we choose to work – entertainment, education, business, service, public service – and at the communities in which we live – urban, suburban, rural – as barometers of our worth as people. They rank us by the degrees written upon pieces of paper and upon the university or college seal that adorns the top.
We are divided by religion. Each religious organization, sect, and denomination privileging one another differently. It is the same with regionalism and nationality.
We tout the value of equality and then conspire against ourselves by applying false labels and hierarchies, undermining our own proclamations with hypocrisy.
Communism is a nice theory. But in practice, people are not designed, not engineered, not bred to quietly acquiesce to our own diminishment. And that, ultimately, is what pure equality would do. Zamyatin’s We, Orwell’s 1984. There can be no true equality without the complete annihilation of everything that makes us truly human.
We are not all equal. We never will be. But let us define our inequalities by things other than skin color or national origin or gender or sexual preference. Define our inequalities not as “good” and “better,” or “bad” and “worse,” but by “this” and “that.” Let us define our inequalities as what we do and what we believe in, rather than our genetics or the happenstance of our birth. Let us choose how we wish to differ, and respect the fact that we are not equals, nor should we be. I am smarter than many people. But there are many people more skilled than I am in many ways. Stronger or faster or more dexterous or more graceful or more mathematically minded or musically talented. We are both greater and lesser than one another. This is not equality. It is diversity.
Let us be content with our inequality, let us celebrate our inequality, and accept that, ultimately, we are as high above others as others are above us.
It’s a nice thought. But one that – I’m afraid – is an impossibility.
This is not to say that I believe poverty is a necessity. I don’t. I cheered as loud as anybody when feudalism fell. I even think that it is possible to functionally eradicate poverty, at least within the Western World. But I do not think that economic equality is feasible in any way.
We’ve reached the point in the historical timeline when the Cold War has become history. When college students were no longer alive at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and rapidly approaching the time when they won’t have been alive for the fall of the USSR. I remember both. My parents remember Vietnam, my grandparents World War II.
Equality in any sense is a utopian pipe dream. It’s a nice dream, yes. But only a dream. Like Willy Loman’s “well-known.”
I believe that, inherently, people are equal. No skin color or gender or genetics or ethnicity or sexual preference is inherently better or worse than any other. People are equal.
Society is not. Class, status, education, employment. All these are divisive and discordant. They rank us by our grades, by our height, our weight, our standardized test performance, our salaries. They look at the industries in which we choose to work – entertainment, education, business, service, public service – and at the communities in which we live – urban, suburban, rural – as barometers of our worth as people. They rank us by the degrees written upon pieces of paper and upon the university or college seal that adorns the top.
We are divided by religion. Each religious organization, sect, and denomination privileging one another differently. It is the same with regionalism and nationality.
We tout the value of equality and then conspire against ourselves by applying false labels and hierarchies, undermining our own proclamations with hypocrisy.
Communism is a nice theory. But in practice, people are not designed, not engineered, not bred to quietly acquiesce to our own diminishment. And that, ultimately, is what pure equality would do. Zamyatin’s We, Orwell’s 1984. There can be no true equality without the complete annihilation of everything that makes us truly human.
We are not all equal. We never will be. But let us define our inequalities by things other than skin color or national origin or gender or sexual preference. Define our inequalities not as “good” and “better,” or “bad” and “worse,” but by “this” and “that.” Let us define our inequalities as what we do and what we believe in, rather than our genetics or the happenstance of our birth. Let us choose how we wish to differ, and respect the fact that we are not equals, nor should we be. I am smarter than many people. But there are many people more skilled than I am in many ways. Stronger or faster or more dexterous or more graceful or more mathematically minded or musically talented. We are both greater and lesser than one another. This is not equality. It is diversity.
Let us be content with our inequality, let us celebrate our inequality, and accept that, ultimately, we are as high above others as others are above us.
Monday, April 21, 2008
History of Violence
Our society, as I have mentioned before, is preoccupied with violence. With watching it, with committing it, and - yes - with censuring it. We go to movies slathered with more gore than eloquence, we watch murder and war on the news, we save Darfur (as well we should), and we enter into the cybernetic domain of exploded pixels on our computers, Xboxes, and PS-whatevers. And then we click our tongues at the violence of today's children.
Please, don't think that I'm censuring violence in the media and in video games. I'm not. But I am recognizing the hypocrisy inherent in a society that both glorifies and vilifies violence. A society that cannot teach itself about appropriate and inappropriate violence. A society that likes to pretend it isn't violent, when it really is.
I've talked before about the productive and sacrificial nature of violence. I've cited Rene Girard's Violence and the Sacred, but that's not going to stop me from doing it again. He writes,
Violence is frequently called irrational. It has its reasons, however, and can marshal some rather convincing ones when the need arises. Yet these reasons cannot be taken seriously, no matter how valid they may appear. Violence itself will discard them if the initial object remains persistently out of reach and continues to provoke hostility. When unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that excited its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand. (2)
We are a nation at war. No one doubts, no one questions this. But for what purpose? To what end? For freedom? Justice? The American Way? The sheer plethora of abstract concepts that have led our nation to war are staggering. The "War on Terror." I understand what that means, but I cannot help but conjure up images of fully armed marines rushing into a child's bedroom at night to make war on the monster that turns out to be nothing more than a clothes-rack when the lights are turned on. How many of our boogeymen are just as real?
Girard's point is that violence deferred will find an outlet. When you can't find the object of your hatred, then you take it out on someone else. Who hasn't? Bad day at work, you come home and yell at your husband, your wife, your kids, the dog... Minor violence, yes. But violence nonetheless.
So what happens when a country seeks its enemy and doesn't find it? Violence deferred. Whole nations have gone to war and reduced one another to rubble over a lost traitor, a lost object, a lost ideal. Because whatever it was that was lost is gone, and we seek to replace it with something else, a surrogate, a scapegoat, "chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand."
It is not a nice thing to contemplate the truth of human nature. When we are enraged at something we cannot reach, something we cannot find, something we know we cannot defeat, we lash out at something "vulnerable and close at hand." Our neighbors. Pets. Children. We make them - in our minds - the surrogate cause of our violence. We substitute them for whatever it is that has provoked us.
But violence, as Girard says, begets violence. And when the sacrifice is an unworthy substitute - when it does not, as we intend, diffuse the violence directed at it because it is not a close enough analog to the original source - it becomes a further source of violence. A vicious cycle.
This is not to say that we should go about killing our bosses or destroying the computer out of sheer frustration. We should find outlets. But positive ones. Ones whose role is to be surrogate - a movie, a video game, a literal punching bag at the gym.
But that is not my point here. My point is that we make war in the name of peace, commit violence in the name of ending it, but we do not commit our violence upon the right victims. We choose abstract concepts that are by nature untouchable because they are not tangible. One cannot kill a concept. We set ourselves up for sacrificial failure because we choose to make our target something that cannot be reified.
And then we try to kill it. Collateral damage. Civilian casualties. Genocide.
There is no uplifting message at the end of all this. No platitude to warm the heart and make us believe it will all be okay. It won't. It can't. We have begun to walk a path that leads only to death, and until we realize what it is we are fighting against, we will only find further violence.
Please, don't think that I'm censuring violence in the media and in video games. I'm not. But I am recognizing the hypocrisy inherent in a society that both glorifies and vilifies violence. A society that cannot teach itself about appropriate and inappropriate violence. A society that likes to pretend it isn't violent, when it really is.
I've talked before about the productive and sacrificial nature of violence. I've cited Rene Girard's Violence and the Sacred, but that's not going to stop me from doing it again. He writes,
Violence is frequently called irrational. It has its reasons, however, and can marshal some rather convincing ones when the need arises. Yet these reasons cannot be taken seriously, no matter how valid they may appear. Violence itself will discard them if the initial object remains persistently out of reach and continues to provoke hostility. When unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that excited its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand. (2)
We are a nation at war. No one doubts, no one questions this. But for what purpose? To what end? For freedom? Justice? The American Way? The sheer plethora of abstract concepts that have led our nation to war are staggering. The "War on Terror." I understand what that means, but I cannot help but conjure up images of fully armed marines rushing into a child's bedroom at night to make war on the monster that turns out to be nothing more than a clothes-rack when the lights are turned on. How many of our boogeymen are just as real?
Girard's point is that violence deferred will find an outlet. When you can't find the object of your hatred, then you take it out on someone else. Who hasn't? Bad day at work, you come home and yell at your husband, your wife, your kids, the dog... Minor violence, yes. But violence nonetheless.
So what happens when a country seeks its enemy and doesn't find it? Violence deferred. Whole nations have gone to war and reduced one another to rubble over a lost traitor, a lost object, a lost ideal. Because whatever it was that was lost is gone, and we seek to replace it with something else, a surrogate, a scapegoat, "chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand."
It is not a nice thing to contemplate the truth of human nature. When we are enraged at something we cannot reach, something we cannot find, something we know we cannot defeat, we lash out at something "vulnerable and close at hand." Our neighbors. Pets. Children. We make them - in our minds - the surrogate cause of our violence. We substitute them for whatever it is that has provoked us.
But violence, as Girard says, begets violence. And when the sacrifice is an unworthy substitute - when it does not, as we intend, diffuse the violence directed at it because it is not a close enough analog to the original source - it becomes a further source of violence. A vicious cycle.
This is not to say that we should go about killing our bosses or destroying the computer out of sheer frustration. We should find outlets. But positive ones. Ones whose role is to be surrogate - a movie, a video game, a literal punching bag at the gym.
But that is not my point here. My point is that we make war in the name of peace, commit violence in the name of ending it, but we do not commit our violence upon the right victims. We choose abstract concepts that are by nature untouchable because they are not tangible. One cannot kill a concept. We set ourselves up for sacrificial failure because we choose to make our target something that cannot be reified.
And then we try to kill it. Collateral damage. Civilian casualties. Genocide.
There is no uplifting message at the end of all this. No platitude to warm the heart and make us believe it will all be okay. It won't. It can't. We have begun to walk a path that leads only to death, and until we realize what it is we are fighting against, we will only find further violence.
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
How Inversion Wrote my Dissertation
As I work through the impossible process of producing a book-length (and hopefully book-worthy) academic work, I find that much of what I have to say all boils down to the same basic point and the same basic elements.
On the one hand, this is A Good Thing. This means that my organizing thesis isn't insane. It means that I am on to Something. It also means that each of my plays ends up proving the same thing in ways that are only very subtly different. Trying to wrap my head around how to articulate why, for instance, Richard II isn't exactly like 3 Henry VI is fascinating. In the "oh, look, bone poking through my skin" kind of way.
You'll forgive me for being paranoid and not posting it here. Suffice it to say, it involves dying and Jesus. Of course, so do many things in our Christian-centered nation. But that's another bone to chew.
The main point here is that I've discovered that inversion and opposition are a very useful way to make the same point. Now, you wouldn't think that saying the opposite of what I just said would in fact prove it all over again, but that's just how screwed up academics are sometimes. For example, "Bob is a tree, and therefore we can cut him down," is astonishingly the same thing as "We cut down Jimmy, and therefore he is a tree."
Now before the philosophers and logicians out there all have heart attacks, I realize that this appears to fail. But in the dissertation, it doesn't. There are magical categories in the world for which the above formulation actually follows.
Unfortunately, sometimes they appear in the real world, too. And they get used even when they fail. Miserably. (Choose to apply that modifier to whatever you wish.)
For instance, in supporting the government and being a terrorist. It may be true that if you are a terrorist, you do not support the government. No objections from me. However, if you do not support the government, there is no law in logic or even in creation that says you are automatically a terrorist. Not even in Shakespeare. Hell, especially not in Shakespeare. But that's another rant.
The world, as I am often fond of saying, is not a set of dichotomies. We are not all either one thing or another. In the most platitudinous of phrases: the world is not black and white.
Come on, people. Shakespeare got it. Even Beaumont and Fletcher got it, and I'm convinced they got the shorter end of the smart-stick. Even - and this is the big one - even Elizabeth I got it, and let me tell you, she was not a merciful lady. That woman was brutal, but very politically savvy.
She said (supposedly), "I am Richard II, know ye not that?" She chopped off the head of the Earl of Essex when he rebelled... even though he was one of her favorites. But she didn't order the execution, imprisonment, or even the censure of the players who put on Richard II, performed on the eve of the rebellion and commissioned by Essex.
And why not?
Because she understood the difference between terrorism and political commentary. Amazing. In 1601. Four-hundred and seven years ago. She didn't even send any of the actors to Guantanamo... er... the Tower.
Was Elizabethan England a veritable paradise? No. Not in the least. Between the plague rats and the smell, I much prefer the twenty-first century, thank you. But that doesn't mean we can't learn from the ghosts of our own history. They were not idiots, our social and political predecessors. They were not barbarians, at least not any more so than we are today.
Sure, they enjoyed violent entertainment... but then, so do we. They unjustly imprisoned traitors... but so do we. They censured dissidents... but so do we. Did they like a little more poetry with their gore? Sure. But they didn't have CGI.
On the one hand, this is A Good Thing. This means that my organizing thesis isn't insane. It means that I am on to Something. It also means that each of my plays ends up proving the same thing in ways that are only very subtly different. Trying to wrap my head around how to articulate why, for instance, Richard II isn't exactly like 3 Henry VI is fascinating. In the "oh, look, bone poking through my skin" kind of way.
You'll forgive me for being paranoid and not posting it here. Suffice it to say, it involves dying and Jesus. Of course, so do many things in our Christian-centered nation. But that's another bone to chew.
The main point here is that I've discovered that inversion and opposition are a very useful way to make the same point. Now, you wouldn't think that saying the opposite of what I just said would in fact prove it all over again, but that's just how screwed up academics are sometimes. For example, "Bob is a tree, and therefore we can cut him down," is astonishingly the same thing as "We cut down Jimmy, and therefore he is a tree."
Now before the philosophers and logicians out there all have heart attacks, I realize that this appears to fail. But in the dissertation, it doesn't. There are magical categories in the world for which the above formulation actually follows.
Unfortunately, sometimes they appear in the real world, too. And they get used even when they fail. Miserably. (Choose to apply that modifier to whatever you wish.)
For instance, in supporting the government and being a terrorist. It may be true that if you are a terrorist, you do not support the government. No objections from me. However, if you do not support the government, there is no law in logic or even in creation that says you are automatically a terrorist. Not even in Shakespeare. Hell, especially not in Shakespeare. But that's another rant.
The world, as I am often fond of saying, is not a set of dichotomies. We are not all either one thing or another. In the most platitudinous of phrases: the world is not black and white.
Come on, people. Shakespeare got it. Even Beaumont and Fletcher got it, and I'm convinced they got the shorter end of the smart-stick. Even - and this is the big one - even Elizabeth I got it, and let me tell you, she was not a merciful lady. That woman was brutal, but very politically savvy.
She said (supposedly), "I am Richard II, know ye not that?" She chopped off the head of the Earl of Essex when he rebelled... even though he was one of her favorites. But she didn't order the execution, imprisonment, or even the censure of the players who put on Richard II, performed on the eve of the rebellion and commissioned by Essex.
And why not?
Because she understood the difference between terrorism and political commentary. Amazing. In 1601. Four-hundred and seven years ago. She didn't even send any of the actors to Guantanamo... er... the Tower.
Was Elizabethan England a veritable paradise? No. Not in the least. Between the plague rats and the smell, I much prefer the twenty-first century, thank you. But that doesn't mean we can't learn from the ghosts of our own history. They were not idiots, our social and political predecessors. They were not barbarians, at least not any more so than we are today.
Sure, they enjoyed violent entertainment... but then, so do we. They unjustly imprisoned traitors... but so do we. They censured dissidents... but so do we. Did they like a little more poetry with their gore? Sure. But they didn't have CGI.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
Why Celebrity?
An interesting question, in this day and age. What causes us to valorize, to deify particular people within our culture? Why these people? Particularly - if one considers the Brittany Spears and Lindsay Lohan type - why these people? What is it about them that attracts our attention, draws our collective eye, makes us want to worship not only them, but the proverbial ground they walk on?
I often find myself mostly exempt from this tendency. Mostly. I do have authors whose blogs I read or whose books I check up on. I have musicians whose work I enjoy and listen to with frequency. There are academic speakers I would happily listen to or discuss issues with. But for the most part... I must confess I just don't get it.
I understand the principle. It's one that I deal with on a fairly regular basis, if only in a histo-literary context. But that's how I often relate to the world these days.
In Shakespeare's time, people believed that physical proximity to the monarch somehow let something kingly "rub off" on you. It why "gentleman of the privy chamber" was actually a desired title. You got to be the honored man who got to wipe the kingly ass. How fortunate for you. It's also why we know so much about kingly stools. Not the kind with legs, either. David Starkey - who has several very interesting books on Henry VIII and Elizabeth - wrote an article entitled "Representation Though Intimacy" that details the way in which physical contact and proximity to the king (here, Henry VIII) endowed an individual with an element of the sacred supposedly possessed by the king:
the vehicle [the body] was itself a symbol, with two distinct sets of meanings: one sacred, the other profane... The literalism is transparent: the king’s hands had been annointed at his coronation and hence were holy; they then rubbed off their benediction onto the metal. Thus, though there is no formal contemporary evidence on the point, there can be little doubt that in the intimate physical contact of body service the royal charisma was felt to rub off onto the servant, who thereby became himself endowed with part of the royal virtue. (Starkey 208)
Is that really what celebrity is all about? Do we have the sense (however subconscious) that some of their "greatness," their "sacredness" will rub off on us? Will somehow make us better or more interesting or more something?
I get being impressed by great artists/writers/musicians/actors/etc. I get that. What I don't get is the fanatic desire to touch them. Or to touch something they've touched. (To say nothing about getting body parts signed.)
For centuries, people went to kings because they could cure the "king's evil" (aka Scrofula). People made pilgrimages to holy sites, carried relics or bottles of holy water from a particular church, and visited the graves of saints. All because of this fascination with touching the ding an sich. The thing itself.
Touch is one of those things, those tactile, visceral, human things. Basic human contact. It's vital to not only our emotional health, but - some say - our very survival. Certainly, if you can't tell whether you're about to put your hand in a fire, you've got survival issues, but that's not what I mean. We get starved for touch, for contact. After a long day, we come home to our loved ones and hug them, kiss them, touch them. We use our bodies as a way to reassure ourselves that we're not alone, but also to convince ourselves that we're real.
Is that the importance behind - excuse the expression - touching Victoria Kahn? To determine that genius, that greatness, is, in fact, real?
If I can put my hand on it, then that must mean it's not a figment of my imagination. And if it's real, then I can share it. Even if only some tiny part of it. It can be mine, too. If it's real. If I can touch it.
Our eyes can deceive us, our ears can lie to us, our noses be fooled by oils and perfumes. But our hands... We can't yet convince them that something is real when it's not. So touching celebrity is nothing more or less than that basic human affirmation of reality. It's here. It's real.
I'm real.
I often find myself mostly exempt from this tendency. Mostly. I do have authors whose blogs I read or whose books I check up on. I have musicians whose work I enjoy and listen to with frequency. There are academic speakers I would happily listen to or discuss issues with. But for the most part... I must confess I just don't get it.
I understand the principle. It's one that I deal with on a fairly regular basis, if only in a histo-literary context. But that's how I often relate to the world these days.
In Shakespeare's time, people believed that physical proximity to the monarch somehow let something kingly "rub off" on you. It why "gentleman of the privy chamber" was actually a desired title. You got to be the honored man who got to wipe the kingly ass. How fortunate for you. It's also why we know so much about kingly stools. Not the kind with legs, either. David Starkey - who has several very interesting books on Henry VIII and Elizabeth - wrote an article entitled "Representation Though Intimacy" that details the way in which physical contact and proximity to the king (here, Henry VIII) endowed an individual with an element of the sacred supposedly possessed by the king:
the vehicle [the body] was itself a symbol, with two distinct sets of meanings: one sacred, the other profane... The literalism is transparent: the king’s hands had been annointed at his coronation and hence were holy; they then rubbed off their benediction onto the metal. Thus, though there is no formal contemporary evidence on the point, there can be little doubt that in the intimate physical contact of body service the royal charisma was felt to rub off onto the servant, who thereby became himself endowed with part of the royal virtue. (Starkey 208)
Is that really what celebrity is all about? Do we have the sense (however subconscious) that some of their "greatness," their "sacredness" will rub off on us? Will somehow make us better or more interesting or more something?
I get being impressed by great artists/writers/musicians/actors/etc. I get that. What I don't get is the fanatic desire to touch them. Or to touch something they've touched. (To say nothing about getting body parts signed.)
For centuries, people went to kings because they could cure the "king's evil" (aka Scrofula). People made pilgrimages to holy sites, carried relics or bottles of holy water from a particular church, and visited the graves of saints. All because of this fascination with touching the ding an sich. The thing itself.
Touch is one of those things, those tactile, visceral, human things. Basic human contact. It's vital to not only our emotional health, but - some say - our very survival. Certainly, if you can't tell whether you're about to put your hand in a fire, you've got survival issues, but that's not what I mean. We get starved for touch, for contact. After a long day, we come home to our loved ones and hug them, kiss them, touch them. We use our bodies as a way to reassure ourselves that we're not alone, but also to convince ourselves that we're real.
Is that the importance behind - excuse the expression - touching Victoria Kahn? To determine that genius, that greatness, is, in fact, real?
If I can put my hand on it, then that must mean it's not a figment of my imagination. And if it's real, then I can share it. Even if only some tiny part of it. It can be mine, too. If it's real. If I can touch it.
Our eyes can deceive us, our ears can lie to us, our noses be fooled by oils and perfumes. But our hands... We can't yet convince them that something is real when it's not. So touching celebrity is nothing more or less than that basic human affirmation of reality. It's here. It's real.
I'm real.
Tuesday, April 01, 2008
Sacrificial Violence
Violence is something with which today's society is eminently familiar. Something that has become so much a part of our everyday lives, that we no longer cringe to see it on the news. That we go to movies that valorize the violent hero. That we dismiss it as "terrorism" or "patriotism" without bothering to realize that they are often one and the same.
And yet, when we look back over the centuries, we condemn cultures who embrace their violence. The Aztecs, the ancient Celts, the Spartans... any society who understood the human impulse toward violence, we label as "barbaric."
As Rene Girard notes in Violence and the Sacred, violent sacrifice is simply an alternative outlet for natural human violent tendencies. He also notes that violence is inextricably intertwined with sanctity: "Violence and the sacred are inseparable" (19), and, further, "Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred" (31).
The "secret soul."
Violence, then, is the core, the essence, the fundamental root of all that we have determined to be sacred. It is the lifeblood - and the deathblood - of our society. The foundational stone for every belief system and governmental institution we have managed to construct in our time as self-aware entities on this planet. For all our claims of modernity, all that we term "civilized" is just as anchored in violence as the human sacrifice flayed on the altar of the sun-god. And all of them are designed to curb the very thing they emblematize.
The procedures that keep men's violence in bounds have one thing in common: they are no strangers to the ways of violence. There is reason to believe that they are all rooted in religion. As we have seen, the various forms of prevention go hand in hand with religious practices. The curative procedures are also imbued with religious concepts - both the rudimentary sacrificial rites and the more advanced judicial forms. Religion in its broadest sense, then, must be another term for that obscurity that surrounds men's efforts to defend himself by curative or preventative means against his own violence. It is that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when that system replaces sacrifice. This obscurity coincides with the transcendental effectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and legitimate successfully opposed to a violence that is unjust, illegal, and illegitimate.
We are a nation, a civilization, a world, of sacrifice. Whether we view it as barbarity, symbolism, or justice, sacrifice pervades every level of our conscious and subconscious.
For example. The dominant religion in our country symbolically sacrifices human flesh and then passes it around for its worshipers to eat. Sometimes every day. They wear images of human torture - for that's what a cross was for, folks - around their necks. They worship at the nailed and bleeding feet of a man nailed to a piece of wood and left to drown in his own blood. Disgusting when you think about it that way, yes? But it's symbolic. It isn't real.
Our justice system is designed to use violence to mitigate violence. Death penalty, people. And if not that, then imprisonment, which Foucault will tell you is its own kind of violence. It doesn't much matter (for the sake of my argument, anyway) if the violence is corporeal or psychological. It's still using violence to curb violence. To - Girard argues - stifle the cyclic perpetuation of vengeance with sanctioned violence. Whatever. It's still violence.
Do I even need to say anything about our entertainment? I didn't think so.
This is not to say - at all - that I'm against violence. I'm against beating the crap out of your neighbor for no good reason, but I'm not against the symbolic, and even occasional literal, violence in which our lives are steeped. No, I don't worship a dead man on a cross. But I find the idea of lauding self-sacrifice and respecting the kind of will it takes to die in a horrible, painful way worth attention. Perhaps not to the degree it is given... but, then, what irritates me about that is that the people who hold it in the highest regard don't seem to understand precisely what it is they are doing. If they acknowledged their veneration of violence, great. But they don't. They claim for it "peace" and "mercy" and "love," all the while behaving like boorish and ignorant yahoos.
But that's a rant for another day. Or two. Or twelve.
I think violence - particularly the kind we see in video games - is good for us. Gets the blood and the juices flowing. Reminds us that we are, fundamentally, animals. Higher animals, certainly, but still animals. Predators.
We are what we are. We are violent beings. Rather than pretend that we are not, we should do as our ancestors did. No, not rip people's beating hearts out of their chests and offer them up to the parrot-god of the moon. Though that does sound like fun...
Sacrifice. Sacrifice to ourselves and for ourselves.
So go ahead. Pick up the mouse and keyboard, the controller, the wiimote. Shoot the electronic and pixelated zombies, the splicers, the vampires and ghouls and ghosties and three-legged beasties. Sacrifice the ball. Sacrifice the pain as you push yourself another mile, another foot. Commit violence, but make it constructive. Make it count. Make it sacrificial.
And yet, when we look back over the centuries, we condemn cultures who embrace their violence. The Aztecs, the ancient Celts, the Spartans... any society who understood the human impulse toward violence, we label as "barbaric."
As Rene Girard notes in Violence and the Sacred, violent sacrifice is simply an alternative outlet for natural human violent tendencies. He also notes that violence is inextricably intertwined with sanctity: "Violence and the sacred are inseparable" (19), and, further, "Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred" (31).
The "secret soul."
Violence, then, is the core, the essence, the fundamental root of all that we have determined to be sacred. It is the lifeblood - and the deathblood - of our society. The foundational stone for every belief system and governmental institution we have managed to construct in our time as self-aware entities on this planet. For all our claims of modernity, all that we term "civilized" is just as anchored in violence as the human sacrifice flayed on the altar of the sun-god. And all of them are designed to curb the very thing they emblematize.
The procedures that keep men's violence in bounds have one thing in common: they are no strangers to the ways of violence. There is reason to believe that they are all rooted in religion. As we have seen, the various forms of prevention go hand in hand with religious practices. The curative procedures are also imbued with religious concepts - both the rudimentary sacrificial rites and the more advanced judicial forms. Religion in its broadest sense, then, must be another term for that obscurity that surrounds men's efforts to defend himself by curative or preventative means against his own violence. It is that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when that system replaces sacrifice. This obscurity coincides with the transcendental effectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and legitimate successfully opposed to a violence that is unjust, illegal, and illegitimate.
We are a nation, a civilization, a world, of sacrifice. Whether we view it as barbarity, symbolism, or justice, sacrifice pervades every level of our conscious and subconscious.
For example. The dominant religion in our country symbolically sacrifices human flesh and then passes it around for its worshipers to eat. Sometimes every day. They wear images of human torture - for that's what a cross was for, folks - around their necks. They worship at the nailed and bleeding feet of a man nailed to a piece of wood and left to drown in his own blood. Disgusting when you think about it that way, yes? But it's symbolic. It isn't real.
Our justice system is designed to use violence to mitigate violence. Death penalty, people. And if not that, then imprisonment, which Foucault will tell you is its own kind of violence. It doesn't much matter (for the sake of my argument, anyway) if the violence is corporeal or psychological. It's still using violence to curb violence. To - Girard argues - stifle the cyclic perpetuation of vengeance with sanctioned violence. Whatever. It's still violence.
Do I even need to say anything about our entertainment? I didn't think so.
This is not to say - at all - that I'm against violence. I'm against beating the crap out of your neighbor for no good reason, but I'm not against the symbolic, and even occasional literal, violence in which our lives are steeped. No, I don't worship a dead man on a cross. But I find the idea of lauding self-sacrifice and respecting the kind of will it takes to die in a horrible, painful way worth attention. Perhaps not to the degree it is given... but, then, what irritates me about that is that the people who hold it in the highest regard don't seem to understand precisely what it is they are doing. If they acknowledged their veneration of violence, great. But they don't. They claim for it "peace" and "mercy" and "love," all the while behaving like boorish and ignorant yahoos.
But that's a rant for another day. Or two. Or twelve.
I think violence - particularly the kind we see in video games - is good for us. Gets the blood and the juices flowing. Reminds us that we are, fundamentally, animals. Higher animals, certainly, but still animals. Predators.
We are what we are. We are violent beings. Rather than pretend that we are not, we should do as our ancestors did. No, not rip people's beating hearts out of their chests and offer them up to the parrot-god of the moon. Though that does sound like fun...
Sacrifice. Sacrifice to ourselves and for ourselves.
So go ahead. Pick up the mouse and keyboard, the controller, the wiimote. Shoot the electronic and pixelated zombies, the splicers, the vampires and ghouls and ghosties and three-legged beasties. Sacrifice the ball. Sacrifice the pain as you push yourself another mile, another foot. Commit violence, but make it constructive. Make it count. Make it sacrificial.
Friday, March 28, 2008
Conclusions of the Godless
Having finished Dawkins' The God Delusion yesterday, I have some further thoughts on the book and its general premise.
Dawkins proves himself to be a remarkably enlightened individual who has an incredible level of frustration with the current state of international psyches. He just doesn't understand how so many people could be confronted with the same universe as the one in which he finds himself and not come to the same conclusions he does.
I sympathize.
I do understand how someone might wish to believe in god or in the supernatural. I even understand how they can believe in it. I've seen enough strange and unexplainable things in my life to have my own moments of doubt, though I must confess that I consider the supernatural to simply be things-we-can't-explain-yet-but-someday-will. Even if that means finding a scientific explanation for hauntings, etc. that includes the dead. Great. Fine by me.
What I - and Dawkins - do not understand is the type of mentality that allows a person to believe something even when confronted with evidence to the contrary. Creationism, for instance. Like Dawkins, I tend to cringe at the phrase "intelligent design," though I do understand the thought that maybe god got the whole ball rolling. But then, like the proverbial ball, it rolled along its evolutionary way.
I'm sorry, but the earth is NOT 6000 years old. It just isn't. It's millions of years old, and that - as Dawkins points out - is just so much cooler than if it were a mere 6000. But this wasn't meant to be a post on creationism versus evolution.
It's a post on religion itself. I tend to harbor what may be an irrational animosity toward organized religion. It all started - as I said in an earlier post - with a pink button. Funny how so small a thing can be a life-changing, mind-altering thing. The proverbial straw.
But once my eyes were open to the idiocy going on around me - at the tender age of six, mind you, things began to make more sense. Grow more infuriating, too. All of the things a child must do in Catholic school seemed more and more ridiculous the older I got, and the very notion of god slipped away into the shadows as I began to realize that the people around me were more interested in themselves than in the god in which they professed to believe. It wasn't simply that they were children. It was that the god - the "little god" - in which they had faith would damn me for any number of insignificant things.
God, in my rapidly expanding world, was a thing of rules. A thing of limitations and condemnations. A thing that tried to stifle my voice, my creativity, my self. And I decided - very early - that I was having none of it. God was, insofar as I could tell, an excuse for people to tell me what to do. Dawkins agrees:
Martin Luther was well aware that reason was religion's arch-enemy, and he frequently warned of its dangers: 'Reason is the greatest enemy that faith has; it never comes to the aid of spiritual things, but more frequently than not struggles against the divine Word, treating with contempt all that emanates from God.' Again: 'Whoever wants to be a Christian should tear the eyes out of his reason.' And again: 'Reason should be destroyed in all Christians.' (221)
The elimination of reason would be the elimination of one of the fundamental things that makes us human and sentient. I suppose it would disprove evolution - if we abandon reason, then we all devolve into monkeys. We're already slinging metaphorical feces at one another; why not make it real feces? It can't possibly smell any more of bullsh*t than the Creationist Museum.
Did you know, for instance, that dinosaurs didn't come with name tags? And did you know that the T-rex ate fruit because in Eden there was no death and therefore he couldn't have eaten animals? Well, then. I guess T-rex got to the Tree first and the reason dinosaurs got wiped out is because of a stupid animal with too-short front arms that got hungry and made itself as god. *BLAM!* Enter falling sky-bits. Good-bye T-rex. Adam and Eve were really the second expulsion. (Please note that the Creationists' assertions end with the last question mark. If you couldn't tell that, it may be a sign of just how stupid their logic *cough* really is.)
Finally, though, my biggest complaint about religion is another mentioned by Dawkins. The fact that people do things in the name of religion that are otherwise entirely unsanctionable. The Crusades, for instance. Under what other auspices could an entire continent send droves of children off to die? Again, to quote Dawkins:
As the Nobel Prize-winning American physicist Steven Weinberg said, 'Religion is an insult to human dignity. With or without it, you'd have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, it takes religion.' Blaise Pascal (he of the wager) said something similar: 'Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction.' (283)
I'm sure we can all run through a laundry-list of atrocities committed in the name of one god or another. The wars, the deaths, the destruction. Only patriotism can convince people as wholeheartedly to commit themselves to death and slaughter... but at least patriotism has a tangible result. The safety of a nation makes infinitely more sense than... than what?
What do we get from killing for religion? Sent to a magical land which has what? Puffy clouds and wings? What if you're afraid of heights? Virgins? Not for long. A table of mead and women and war? I hope they've got cures for hangovers and syphillis. Any conception of the afterlife that we've managed to concoct (with the exception of the reincarnationists, who actually make some sense) is based on a flawed, human understanding of the universe. The things we get are the very same things we're warned away from during our lives as being sinful (with the exception of the very nice Norse - drunken sex and battle are good things in both worlds).
What is most pathetic - in all senses of the word - about religious devotion is the idea that a person can willfully discard the wonders of the world in favor of imagined wonders of equal or less splendor. I can think of no greater tragedy for the human mind than to be consoled by a weak shadow of this world, to look forward to the promise of something so much the inferior of the universe around them that they cannot see what it is they have.
And if there is a god - particularly a benevolent one - how can it possibly find value in a race of creatures whose motives are all directed at selfish self-promotion? I will be good so that I get to heaven. How is that goodness? It's self-serving and vile. Be good because you wish to be good. Be good because you believe it is good. Don't be good just to get a pat on the head from a great invisible power that could squish you like a bug.
If there is a god, then I hope that it judges us not by our religion or our devotion, but by the quality and content of our characters. It does not need us to believe in it in order to exist. And if it demands worship and devotion, well, then I'm going to blaspheme and say that I agree with Milton's Satan: "Better to reign in Hell than serve in heaven." But I tend to find myself agreeing most with Epicurus:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able, and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
Dawkins proves himself to be a remarkably enlightened individual who has an incredible level of frustration with the current state of international psyches. He just doesn't understand how so many people could be confronted with the same universe as the one in which he finds himself and not come to the same conclusions he does.
I sympathize.
I do understand how someone might wish to believe in god or in the supernatural. I even understand how they can believe in it. I've seen enough strange and unexplainable things in my life to have my own moments of doubt, though I must confess that I consider the supernatural to simply be things-we-can't-explain-yet-but-someday-will. Even if that means finding a scientific explanation for hauntings, etc. that includes the dead. Great. Fine by me.
What I - and Dawkins - do not understand is the type of mentality that allows a person to believe something even when confronted with evidence to the contrary. Creationism, for instance. Like Dawkins, I tend to cringe at the phrase "intelligent design," though I do understand the thought that maybe god got the whole ball rolling. But then, like the proverbial ball, it rolled along its evolutionary way.
I'm sorry, but the earth is NOT 6000 years old. It just isn't. It's millions of years old, and that - as Dawkins points out - is just so much cooler than if it were a mere 6000. But this wasn't meant to be a post on creationism versus evolution.
It's a post on religion itself. I tend to harbor what may be an irrational animosity toward organized religion. It all started - as I said in an earlier post - with a pink button. Funny how so small a thing can be a life-changing, mind-altering thing. The proverbial straw.
But once my eyes were open to the idiocy going on around me - at the tender age of six, mind you, things began to make more sense. Grow more infuriating, too. All of the things a child must do in Catholic school seemed more and more ridiculous the older I got, and the very notion of god slipped away into the shadows as I began to realize that the people around me were more interested in themselves than in the god in which they professed to believe. It wasn't simply that they were children. It was that the god - the "little god" - in which they had faith would damn me for any number of insignificant things.
God, in my rapidly expanding world, was a thing of rules. A thing of limitations and condemnations. A thing that tried to stifle my voice, my creativity, my self. And I decided - very early - that I was having none of it. God was, insofar as I could tell, an excuse for people to tell me what to do. Dawkins agrees:
Martin Luther was well aware that reason was religion's arch-enemy, and he frequently warned of its dangers: 'Reason is the greatest enemy that faith has; it never comes to the aid of spiritual things, but more frequently than not struggles against the divine Word, treating with contempt all that emanates from God.' Again: 'Whoever wants to be a Christian should tear the eyes out of his reason.' And again: 'Reason should be destroyed in all Christians.' (221)
The elimination of reason would be the elimination of one of the fundamental things that makes us human and sentient. I suppose it would disprove evolution - if we abandon reason, then we all devolve into monkeys. We're already slinging metaphorical feces at one another; why not make it real feces? It can't possibly smell any more of bullsh*t than the Creationist Museum.
Did you know, for instance, that dinosaurs didn't come with name tags? And did you know that the T-rex ate fruit because in Eden there was no death and therefore he couldn't have eaten animals? Well, then. I guess T-rex got to the Tree first and the reason dinosaurs got wiped out is because of a stupid animal with too-short front arms that got hungry and made itself as god. *BLAM!* Enter falling sky-bits. Good-bye T-rex. Adam and Eve were really the second expulsion. (Please note that the Creationists' assertions end with the last question mark. If you couldn't tell that, it may be a sign of just how stupid their logic *cough* really is.)
Finally, though, my biggest complaint about religion is another mentioned by Dawkins. The fact that people do things in the name of religion that are otherwise entirely unsanctionable. The Crusades, for instance. Under what other auspices could an entire continent send droves of children off to die? Again, to quote Dawkins:
As the Nobel Prize-winning American physicist Steven Weinberg said, 'Religion is an insult to human dignity. With or without it, you'd have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, it takes religion.' Blaise Pascal (he of the wager) said something similar: 'Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction.' (283)
I'm sure we can all run through a laundry-list of atrocities committed in the name of one god or another. The wars, the deaths, the destruction. Only patriotism can convince people as wholeheartedly to commit themselves to death and slaughter... but at least patriotism has a tangible result. The safety of a nation makes infinitely more sense than... than what?
What do we get from killing for religion? Sent to a magical land which has what? Puffy clouds and wings? What if you're afraid of heights? Virgins? Not for long. A table of mead and women and war? I hope they've got cures for hangovers and syphillis. Any conception of the afterlife that we've managed to concoct (with the exception of the reincarnationists, who actually make some sense) is based on a flawed, human understanding of the universe. The things we get are the very same things we're warned away from during our lives as being sinful (with the exception of the very nice Norse - drunken sex and battle are good things in both worlds).
What is most pathetic - in all senses of the word - about religious devotion is the idea that a person can willfully discard the wonders of the world in favor of imagined wonders of equal or less splendor. I can think of no greater tragedy for the human mind than to be consoled by a weak shadow of this world, to look forward to the promise of something so much the inferior of the universe around them that they cannot see what it is they have.
And if there is a god - particularly a benevolent one - how can it possibly find value in a race of creatures whose motives are all directed at selfish self-promotion? I will be good so that I get to heaven. How is that goodness? It's self-serving and vile. Be good because you wish to be good. Be good because you believe it is good. Don't be good just to get a pat on the head from a great invisible power that could squish you like a bug.
If there is a god, then I hope that it judges us not by our religion or our devotion, but by the quality and content of our characters. It does not need us to believe in it in order to exist. And if it demands worship and devotion, well, then I'm going to blaspheme and say that I agree with Milton's Satan: "Better to reign in Hell than serve in heaven." But I tend to find myself agreeing most with Epicurus:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able, and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
Thursday, March 20, 2008
This is not an American Pipe Dream
I'm teaching Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman. At first glance, it is a play that seems to have little to do with the rise and fall of kings and kingdoms, with the rampant violence that typically graces the pages I study.
But then I got to thinking.
It's been a long time since I read the play. But I remember, vividly, the experience of reading it, if not the play itself.
I remember the way it looked in my head, dusty and drab and dry. Curtains made of wallpaper fabric with yellow fade-marks from too much sun and grease. A wooden floor that hadn't seen wax for years. Doilies made by someone's grandmother once upon a time. An olive-green stove that had made birthday cakes and Christmas cookies, spaghetti from a jar, Betty Crocker cake mix, Jello, and pot roast with little pearl onions and carrots.
I think of Willy Loman as the king of a failing kingdom, surrounded by successful neighbors, with subjects who recognized in his rule faded glory and wished they could still respect the king in his tattered robes. His sons are filled with regret, but they know their father - like King Lear - is no longer fit to rule his house. They are the Cerrex and Porrex to Loman's Gorboduc, Edgar and a legitimate Edmund whose success should be measured in something other than what it is, following their blinded Gloucester-father as he stumbles his way toward the edge of a cliff.
All this leads me to wonder whether or not the American Dream is all that different from any country's dream, from Shakespeare's "Wherefore base?" and the countless tales of upward social mobility all across early modern Europe. After all, Aristotle defined Comedy as the rise in status or fortunes of one who began low.
Tragedy, however, was the fall of one from a height of status or fortune. The decline of the high school football hero to the fat, middle-aged and miserable man who sits morosely in his foam-and-steel cubicle and stares at the blank grey fabric where a window should be.
All this comes back to a point I have made - one that Shakespeare made many-a-time - that our lives are played out as on a stage. We have our exits and our entrances, and we, in our time, will play many parts.
Learn from Willy Loman. Decide, now, that yours will be a Comedy. Decide that, whatever your fortunes may be, you will make yourself rise, if not in wealth or status, then in contentment. Make content your crown, and crown your life in content before you play your final age in mere oblivion, Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.
But then I got to thinking.
It's been a long time since I read the play. But I remember, vividly, the experience of reading it, if not the play itself.
I remember the way it looked in my head, dusty and drab and dry. Curtains made of wallpaper fabric with yellow fade-marks from too much sun and grease. A wooden floor that hadn't seen wax for years. Doilies made by someone's grandmother once upon a time. An olive-green stove that had made birthday cakes and Christmas cookies, spaghetti from a jar, Betty Crocker cake mix, Jello, and pot roast with little pearl onions and carrots.
I think of Willy Loman as the king of a failing kingdom, surrounded by successful neighbors, with subjects who recognized in his rule faded glory and wished they could still respect the king in his tattered robes. His sons are filled with regret, but they know their father - like King Lear - is no longer fit to rule his house. They are the Cerrex and Porrex to Loman's Gorboduc, Edgar and a legitimate Edmund whose success should be measured in something other than what it is, following their blinded Gloucester-father as he stumbles his way toward the edge of a cliff.
All this leads me to wonder whether or not the American Dream is all that different from any country's dream, from Shakespeare's "Wherefore base?" and the countless tales of upward social mobility all across early modern Europe. After all, Aristotle defined Comedy as the rise in status or fortunes of one who began low.
Tragedy, however, was the fall of one from a height of status or fortune. The decline of the high school football hero to the fat, middle-aged and miserable man who sits morosely in his foam-and-steel cubicle and stares at the blank grey fabric where a window should be.
All this comes back to a point I have made - one that Shakespeare made many-a-time - that our lives are played out as on a stage. We have our exits and our entrances, and we, in our time, will play many parts.
Learn from Willy Loman. Decide, now, that yours will be a Comedy. Decide that, whatever your fortunes may be, you will make yourself rise, if not in wealth or status, then in contentment. Make content your crown, and crown your life in content before you play your final age in mere oblivion, Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.
Monday, March 17, 2008
Searching for an Author
As an (aspiring) author - though I suppose, technically, I am a published author, just not in the genre in which I would like to be published - I often think of myself in terms of words. Not language, in general, but words. I see myself sometimes as a me-shaped bottle filled with ink, all swirling and dark and filled with the loops and whorls of letters. I can envision my skin covered with words, tiny insect-like creatures that cover me from head to toe in little tattoo-feet.
In re-reading Luigi Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author for class on Wednesday, I came across this fascinating and brilliant passage:
Father: But don’t you see that the whole trouble lies here. In words, words. Each one of us has within him a whole world of things, each man of us his own special world. And how can we ever come to an understanding if I put in the words I utter the sense and value of things as I see them; while you who listen to me must inevitably translate them according to the conception of things each one of you has within himself. We think we understand each other, but we never really do.
It struck me, then, that what the Father describes is, in essence, the Human Condition. We are all, in some ways, searching for an Author.
In the case of Pirandello's play, the Author for which the Characters search is the Logos, the Word, god. And I think Pirandello is right. We are, all of us, searching for that Author, that Logos, that god.
Regular readers will know, of course, that I am not religious. In any way. I am not looking for god in the traditional or non-traditional sense of the word. But I am looking for Words. Always. It is a perpetual search for the right language to express exactly what haunts my inner castle, the spell that will seal or release my sanctum sanctorum.
Pirandello's Father Character offers the suggestion of impossibility. Of the interiority which Edward Said (in Orientalism) we all bring with us to every cultural, social, or literary encounter. We cannot help but bring our ideologies into play whatever we do, see, hear, or read. I acknowledge this. I embrace it.
I am proud of my ideology. I am proud of the things I choose to reject and of the things I have chosen to bear. I know that my upbringing has colored my world with a particular palette of paints, that my view on the universe in which I find myself awash is mine and mine alone, and thereby flawed. But it is mine.
I am a possessive creature. I like the things that are mine. My world. My words. I think we all like the things that are ours. It is why, as children, our papers, our homework, our art, was proudly given to mommy to put on the refrigerator. It is why we claim what is ours and fight for it. It is why we like to put our own spin on things.
I know this. I accept it. I revel in it. I acknowledge that it is mine, and it is flawed. I acknowledge that my world is not that in which others live, even if a part of them is mine, as a part of me is theirs.
And a part of this is searching for that impossible Author. The Logos. The Word.
The difference, I think, between me and most people is that I choose to find that Author in myself. I am a creator of worlds, a manipulator of universes, a source of salvation and damnation.
And Pirandello realizes this. He is his own Author. He creates himself. Writes his way into and out of corners. But his Father (his god-voice, Author-voice) condemns him for it:
Father: Thus, sir, you see when faith is lacking, it becomes impossible to create certain states of happiness, for we lack the necessary humility. Vaingloriously, we try to substitute ourselves for this faith, creating thus for the rest of the world a reality which we believe after their fashion, while, actually, it doesn't exist. For each one of us has his own reality to be respected before God, even when it is harmful to one's very self.
For Pirandello, then, this world in which the self is the Author, one is condemned. The Author-less Characters in the play are condemned to live and relive the tragedy of their "lives" precisely because there is no pen to script out their existence. No Author. No god. For Pirandello, a godless existence is one in which the self-Author is condemned to make mistakes. To fall into error.
I concur. I make mistakes. I stumble. I fall. I am the ultimate in post-lapserianism. I have long been a proponent of imperfection. It is the bite in the apple that - the myth tells us - gave us the wisdom of gods. And for this, we are damned? Is not this wisdom in and of itself the greatest blessing we ever could have been granted?
I have never understood - and my virulent reaction against Roger Shattuck's Forbidden Knowledge is testament to this - why knowledge is so very bad. Why there are things that I should not - or must not - know. There are horrifying things that exist in our universe. Terrible things. But that does not mean they should be forbidden - at least in theory. We should know the theories, the means, the methods. There are things we should probably not do, but knowledge makes us greater, better, no matter the severity of the information it contains.
And words... Words are the vehicles of this knowledge. The means and method of its transmission. They have become the safeguards of history. They are the elements that compose our collective memory, and, as such, our wisdom.
This is why the pen is mightier than the sword. Why language is the sword of my mouth. And with it, I will destroy thee. Create thee. Love thee.
In re-reading Luigi Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author for class on Wednesday, I came across this fascinating and brilliant passage:
Father: But don’t you see that the whole trouble lies here. In words, words. Each one of us has within him a whole world of things, each man of us his own special world. And how can we ever come to an understanding if I put in the words I utter the sense and value of things as I see them; while you who listen to me must inevitably translate them according to the conception of things each one of you has within himself. We think we understand each other, but we never really do.
It struck me, then, that what the Father describes is, in essence, the Human Condition. We are all, in some ways, searching for an Author.
In the case of Pirandello's play, the Author for which the Characters search is the Logos, the Word, god. And I think Pirandello is right. We are, all of us, searching for that Author, that Logos, that god.
Regular readers will know, of course, that I am not religious. In any way. I am not looking for god in the traditional or non-traditional sense of the word. But I am looking for Words. Always. It is a perpetual search for the right language to express exactly what haunts my inner castle, the spell that will seal or release my sanctum sanctorum.
Pirandello's Father Character offers the suggestion of impossibility. Of the interiority which Edward Said (in Orientalism) we all bring with us to every cultural, social, or literary encounter. We cannot help but bring our ideologies into play whatever we do, see, hear, or read. I acknowledge this. I embrace it.
I am proud of my ideology. I am proud of the things I choose to reject and of the things I have chosen to bear. I know that my upbringing has colored my world with a particular palette of paints, that my view on the universe in which I find myself awash is mine and mine alone, and thereby flawed. But it is mine.
I am a possessive creature. I like the things that are mine. My world. My words. I think we all like the things that are ours. It is why, as children, our papers, our homework, our art, was proudly given to mommy to put on the refrigerator. It is why we claim what is ours and fight for it. It is why we like to put our own spin on things.
I know this. I accept it. I revel in it. I acknowledge that it is mine, and it is flawed. I acknowledge that my world is not that in which others live, even if a part of them is mine, as a part of me is theirs.
And a part of this is searching for that impossible Author. The Logos. The Word.
The difference, I think, between me and most people is that I choose to find that Author in myself. I am a creator of worlds, a manipulator of universes, a source of salvation and damnation.
And Pirandello realizes this. He is his own Author. He creates himself. Writes his way into and out of corners. But his Father (his god-voice, Author-voice) condemns him for it:
Father: Thus, sir, you see when faith is lacking, it becomes impossible to create certain states of happiness, for we lack the necessary humility. Vaingloriously, we try to substitute ourselves for this faith, creating thus for the rest of the world a reality which we believe after their fashion, while, actually, it doesn't exist. For each one of us has his own reality to be respected before God, even when it is harmful to one's very self.
For Pirandello, then, this world in which the self is the Author, one is condemned. The Author-less Characters in the play are condemned to live and relive the tragedy of their "lives" precisely because there is no pen to script out their existence. No Author. No god. For Pirandello, a godless existence is one in which the self-Author is condemned to make mistakes. To fall into error.
I concur. I make mistakes. I stumble. I fall. I am the ultimate in post-lapserianism. I have long been a proponent of imperfection. It is the bite in the apple that - the myth tells us - gave us the wisdom of gods. And for this, we are damned? Is not this wisdom in and of itself the greatest blessing we ever could have been granted?
I have never understood - and my virulent reaction against Roger Shattuck's Forbidden Knowledge is testament to this - why knowledge is so very bad. Why there are things that I should not - or must not - know. There are horrifying things that exist in our universe. Terrible things. But that does not mean they should be forbidden - at least in theory. We should know the theories, the means, the methods. There are things we should probably not do, but knowledge makes us greater, better, no matter the severity of the information it contains.
And words... Words are the vehicles of this knowledge. The means and method of its transmission. They have become the safeguards of history. They are the elements that compose our collective memory, and, as such, our wisdom.
This is why the pen is mightier than the sword. Why language is the sword of my mouth. And with it, I will destroy thee. Create thee. Love thee.
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